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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RONALD J. SCARPA, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISER j 
REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATION ] 
BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ] 
COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Respondent. 
i Case No. 970196-CA 
I Priority No. 14 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A FINAL ORDER OF THE 
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATION BOARD 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Petitioner seeks judicial review of an order of the Real Estate Appraiser 
Registration and Certification Board (the "Board") of the Department of Commerce of 
the State of Utah. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996) and 63-46b-16(1) (1993). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Is the Board's finding that Scarpa fraudulently claimed experience credit 
for appraisals on which he did not provide any significant professional assistance 
-1-
supported by substantial evidence? 
Standard of Review: This is a factual issue. The Board's finding should be 
affirmed if the Court determines it is "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1993); 
accord King v. Industrial Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Has Scarpa adequately briefed his argument challenging the Department 
of Commerce rule requiring the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in this 
case? 
Standard of Review: A party must adequately brief an issue with argument 
and citations to authority. Appellate courts routinely decline to consider arguments 
which are not adequately briefed. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. P.; State v. Yates. 834 
P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992). "[CJourts should uphold agency rules if they are 
reasonable and rational," and will employ an intermediate standard (one of some, but 
not total, deference) in reviewing claims that an agency erred in applying its rules. 
Union Pacific R. v. Auditing Div.. 842 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1992). 
3. Even if the Board erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, was the error rendered harmless by its determination that the proof of 
Scarpa's fraudulent conduct also was sufficient to satisfy a clear and convincing 
evidence standard? 
Standard of Review: Even if an agency has erred, the appellate court may 
grant relief only if the person seeking judicial review was "substantially prejudiced" by 
that error. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1993). Under this standard, an error will be 
-2-
harmless if it is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that 
the error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Morton Intern.. Inc. v. Auditing 
Division. 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991). An error is harmful only if the likelihood of a 
different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine the Court's confidence in the 
outcome. Alta Pacific v. Utah State Tax Com'n. 931 P.2d 103, 116 (Utah 1997), citing 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991). 
4. Did Scarpa waive the argument that the Division did not comply with 
discovery requirements? 
Standard of Review: In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must 
make specific and timely objections to the administrative agency. Barney v. Utah Dept. 
of Commerce. 885 P.2d 809, preserve an issue for appeal, he has waived that issue. 
Barney. 885 P.2d 809; Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n. 855 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah App. 
1993). 
5. Was Scarpa substantially prejudiced because the Division did not provide 
him with Teresa Larsen's working papers? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court may not grant relief from an order of a 
state agency unless the person seeking judicial review was "substantially prejudiced" by 
any of several specified types of error. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1993). Under 
this standard, an error will be harmless if it is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Morton 
Intern.. Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991). An error is harmful only if 
the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine the Court's 
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confidence in the outcome. Alta Pacific v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 931 P.2d 103, 116 
(Utah 1997), citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991).1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following are of central importance to this appeal. 
1. . . . [A]n original certification may only be issued to a person 
who is of good moral character.... Utah Code Ann. § 6 1 -
2b-16(1)(1993) 
2. The board shall require and pass upon proof necessary to 
determine the honesty, competency, integrity, and 
truthfulness of each applicant. Utah Code Ann. § 61 -2b-
16(2) (1993) 
3. The following acts and omissions shall be considered 
grounds for disciplinary action: (1) procuring or attempting to 
procure registration or certification under this chapter by 
fraud or by making a false statement, submitting false 
information, making a material misrepresentation in an 
application filed with the division Utah Code Ann. § 61-
2b-29(1)(1993) 
4. If, after the hearing, the board determines that the registrant 
or certificate holder has violated this chapter, his registration 
or certificate may be suspended, revoked, or denied 
reissuance by written order of the board. Utah Code Ann. § 
61-2b-31(2)(1993) 
5. Standard of Proof. The standard of proof in all proceedings 
under these rules, whether initiated by a notice of agency 
action or request for agency action, shall be a 
Mn his Summary of the Argument, Scarpa states that "additional witnesses for 
the defense were not allowed to testify" regarding various matters. (Scarpa's Brief at 
28). He makes no citation to the record, cites no authority, and does not discuss this 
anywhere else in his brief. Scarpa has thus failed to properly raise this as an issue and 
the Court should disregard it. State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1992). 
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preponderance of the evidence. Utah Administrative Code 
Rule R151-46b-10(8) (October 1, 1996) (Effective March 4, 
1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Events preceding the hearing 
On April 10, 1992, Scarpa obtained a license to act as a registered real estate 
appraiser from the State of Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of Real Estate 
(the "Division")(R. 1182 at 17-19; R. 1222 at 17-21). On November 9, 1994, he 
submitted an application to the Division to become a certified residential appraiser (R. 2 
at If 5; R. 10 at 1f 1; Exhibit 2). 
On February 14,1995, the Division commenced a formal adjudicative 
proceeding against Scarpa by filing before the Board a petition seeking denial of his 
application to become a certified residential appraiser and revocation of his license to 
act as a registered appraiser (R. 1-6). The Division alleged that in submitting that 
application, Scarpa claimed experience credit for appraisals performed by other 
appraisers and on which he had minimal or no active participation (R. 1-6). It also 
alleged that he caused records to be falsified to create the impression that he had 
performed such appraisals, rather than the appraiser who had actually performed them 
(R. 1-6). The Division served Scarpa with the petition and a notice of agency action (R. 
6-9). 
Scarpa filed a reply, opposing the relief requested (R. 10-12). On July 28,1995 
and August 11,1995, he filed a motion and supplemental motion to dismiss the 
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proceeding on various procedural grounds (R. 16-17, 32-34). The Board denied those 
motions on January 26, 1996 (R. 91-97). 
The Board's original Order 
On September 9-10,1996, a formal hearing was held before the Board. The 
Board was assisted by J. Steven Ekiund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department 
of Commerce. (R167-174.) On October 29, 1996, the Board issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and an Order (the "original order"), ordering that Scarpa's 
application for licensure as a certified residential appraiser be denied and that his 
license as a registered appraiser be revoked (R167-174). This original order is 
attached as Addendum "A." 
The Board found that in applying to become a certified residential appraiser, 
Scarpa claimed experience credit for five appraisals performed by Teresa Larsen, with 
the help of Gerald Higgs (R. 167-74). Larsen and Higgs were appraisers affiliated with 
Appraisal Professionals, a company owned by Scarpa (R. 167-68). The Board found 
that although Scarpa provided some assistance and supervision to Larsen, he did not 
provide significant professional assistance such as would entitle him to claim such 
experience credit (R. 167-74). The Board found that the appraisal reports sent to the 
lenders accurately reflected Larsen as the appraiser who had conducted those 
appraisals, but that Scarpa instructed Larsen to prepare an additional copy of each 
appraisal report (R. 167-74). It found that Scarpa instructed Larsen to delete her own 
name and signature from that extra copy, and to reflect Scarpa's name and signature 
as the appraiser who performed those appraisals (R. 167-74). The Board found that 
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Scarpa required the preparation of this extra copy, and signed it, to subsequently claim 
credit for having performed those appraisals (R. 167-174). 
The Board also found that Scarpa claimed experience credit for three appraisals 
performed by Bruce Warburton and Gerald Higgs (R. 169-74). Warburton was a 
registered appraiser affiliated with Scarpa's company (R.169). The Board found that 
although Scarpa provided some assistance and supervision to Warburton, he did not 
provide significant professional assistance such as would entitle him to claim such 
experience credit (R. 169-74). The Board found that Scarpa directed Warburton to 
prepare those three appraisal reports so as to reflect that he had joined Warburton and 
Higgs in conducting those appraisals (R. 169-174). 
The Board also found that Scarpa engaged in this type of practice so frequently 
that there was a lack of evidence that he had performed and could properly claim credit 
for any of the appraisals for which he sought credit on his application for certification (R. 
170). 
The Board concluded, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that Scarpa 
devised a fraudulent scheme in an attempt to obtain licensure as a certified residential 
appraiser, and had thus not established that he possessed the necessary honesty, 
integrity and truthfulness to qualify for such licensure (R. 170-171). 
The Board concluded that Scarpa submitted false information to the Division by 
improperly seeking credit for experience on at least eight appraisals when he had not 
provided significant professional assistance in those appraisals (R. 171). The Board 
concluded that Scarpa engaged in a course of fraudulently devious conduct by creating 
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false copies of appraisals performed by registered appraisers in his employ to 
subsequently claim experience credit for those appraisals (R. 171). It found that 
Scarpa prompted the submission of appraisal reports to lenders which did not reflect 
his participation, but later claimed that he was involved in those appraisals for purposes 
of obtaining experience credit (R.172). It found that Scarpa created false copies of 
appraisals and submitted information to the Division which did not reflect the appraisers 
who had provided significant professional assistance on those appraisals (R.172). The 
Board concluded that Scarpa engaged in unprofessional conduct in the practice of real 
estate appraising which constituted dishonesty and fraud, and that his license to act as 
a registered appraiser should be revoked (R. 170-73). 
The Board's Order on Reconsideration 
Scarpa submitted a request for reconsideration of the Board's order (R175-220). 
Following the submission of memoranda by the parties (R175-220, 224-253, 256-294), 
the Board issued an Order on Request for Agency Reconsideration (the "order on 
reconsideration"), bearing an effective date of February 27,1997 (R. 295-304). This 
order is attached as Addendum "B." As part of its order on reconsideration, the Board 
entered supplemental findings of fact, modified findings of fact, and additional 
conclusions of law, which are summarized below (R. 295-304). The Board reaffirmed 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in its first order to the extent they 
were not modified by the order on reconsideration (R. 295-96). The Board did not 
modify the sanction contained in its original order (R. 295-304). 
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The Board determined that it erred in finding in its original order that Scarpa 
failed to conduct or provide significant professional assistance on any of the appraisals 
listed on his experience documentation form (R. 296-97; R.302-303). It concluded that 
it should not have made such a finding regarding any appraisals other than the Teresa 
Larsen and Bruce Warburton appraisals (R. 296-97). It thus limited its order to those 
eight appraisals (R. 295-304). It rejected Scarpa's implicit assertion that there was any 
evidence the Board was biased against him in this proceeding (R. 303). 
The Board concluded that the evidentiary standard it should use was the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard as prescribed by Department rule, but found 
that the Division also met the "clear and convincing evidence" standard in prevailing in 
the case (R. 295-304). It found that this latter standard was satisfied by Scarpa's own 
testimony at the hearing, which established that he submitted false statements to both 
lending institutions and the Division for varying purposes. (R. 299). 
The Board found that "significant professional assistance," while not defined by 
statute or rule, is a well recognized and commonly understood standard in the appraisal 
industry, that members of the appraisal profession can be properly held to understand 
the various standards of performance which govern all appraisals, and that the Board is 
entitled to apply and interpret that standard of performance in the process of 
administrative adjudication (R. 299-300). It found that Scarpa did not provide significant 
professional assistance so as to claim credit for having performed any of the eight 
appraisals in question (R. 296). 
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The Board found that Scarpa knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that he 
had conducted a complete inspection of the properties appraised by Larsen (R. 296). 
The Board concluded that Scarpa had ample opportunity to obtain access to 
Larsen's working papers both prior to and during the hearing, and that the fact that the 
Division did not provide him with those papers caused him no prejudice (R. 300). The 
Board said this conclusion was further supported by the fact that Scarpa's own 
admissions formed the lynchpin on which its original order was based (R. 300). 
The Board concluded that Scarpa devised a fraudulent scheme, creating false 
copies of appraisals in an attempt to obtain licensure as a certified residential appraiser 
(R. 301). This led the Board to further conclude that whether Scarpa knew how to 
document his experience was not an issue (R. 301). 
Finally, the Board concluded that Scarpa was afforded a fair opportunity to 
present evidence which was neither repetitive nor cumulative, and was not improperly 
limited in his ability to present evidence (R. 303). 
On March 12, 1997, following a motion made by the Division, the Administrative 
Law Judge entered a nunc pro tunc order correcting a clerical error regarding the date 
the October 29, 1996 order would become effective, the date of the order on 
reconsideration, and the deadline for filing a petition for judicial review (R305-309). 
That nunc pro tunc order is attached as Addendum "C.M 
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On March 27, 1997, Scarpa filed the petition for review now pending before this 
Court.2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Utah Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification Act (the "Act"), 
which became effective July f, 1990, provided for an entry-level license designated as 
"state-registered appraiser." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-10 (Supp. 1990). Higher levels 
of licensure designated as "state-certified residential appraiser" and "state-certified 
general appraiser" were made available to state-registered appraisers who attained 
certain levels of experience and fulfilled other requirements. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2b-
13 through 16 (Supp. 1990). These license classifications have continued to the 
present date. 
A 1991 amendment to the Act placed some limitations on the kinds of appraisals 
a registered appraiser could perform. For example, a registered appraiser could not 
2Under Department rules, the final agency action in this case was the Board's 
order on reconsideration, which modified the original order in some ways and otherwise 
reaffirmed it and incorporated it by reference. Utah Administrative Code Rule R.151-
46b-13 (3) (October 1, 1996) (Effective March 4,1996). On pages 4 and 5 of his brief, 
however, Scarpa states that he is seeking review of the Board's original order, its order 
on reconsideration, his own request for agency reconsideration, and the Division's 
response. This court should disregard Scarpa's effort to seek review of anything other 
than the final agency action. His request for reconsideration, the Division's response, 
and those parts of the Board's original order which were changed on reconsideration 
are not a proper subject of the pending petition for review, because they are not part of 
the final agency action. Only the final agency action is subject to judicial review. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14(1); 63-46b-16(1) (1993). The Court should ignore statements 
in Scarpa's brief (such as on pages 11-12) criticizing parts of the Board's original order 
which it later changed after reconsideration. 
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perform appraisals exceeding a certain dollar amount, and could not issue a certified 
appraisal report. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-10 (Supp. 1991). These limitations continue 
to the present date. 
Scarpa became a state-registered real estate appraiser on April 10, 1992 (R. 
1182 at 17-19; R. 1222 at 17-21). He became the original owner, as well as the 
president, of Appraisal Professionals, a company providing appraisal services (R. 1222 
at 22 through R. 1223 at 5; R. 1333 at 20 through R. 1334 at 6.) He contracted with a 
certified general appraiser, Gerald Higgs, to act as a certified appraiser for Appraisal 
Professionals (R. 1445 at 17 through R. 1447 at 7). 
In late December 1992, the Division was contacted by Teresa Larsen, a 
registered appraiser who had recently been working for Appraisal Professionals. 
Larsen told the Division she was concerned that Scarpa would try to claim her 
appraisals for credit on a future application to become a certified appraiser (R. 1178 at 
13-23). Larsen identified five specific appraisals on which she thought this might 
happen (R. 1178 at 24 through R. 1179 at 8). 
The Division then monitored the certification applications it received, watching for 
an application from Scarpa (R. 1179 at 9-14). On November 9, 1994, the Division 
received from Scarpa an application for certification as a certified residential appraiser. 
As part of his application, Scarpa included an experience documentation form claiming 
to have performed appraisals on the five properties Larsen had identified as properties 
she had appraised while working for Scarpa (Exhibit 2; R. 1179 at 14-21). The 
experience documentation form, signed by Scarpa and acknowledged before a notary, 
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contains the following statement: 
Under penalty of perjury, I attest that the information contained on this 
form is true. I understand that I may be required to substantiate the 
experience claimed by submitting written reports or file memoranda, and 
that willfully submitting false information can result in license revocation 
and/or criminal prosecution. 
(Exhibit 2). 
Following an investigation, the Division filed a petition against Scarpa, alleging 
that in submitting that application, Scarpa claimed experience credit for appraisals 
actually done by other appraisers, and on which he had minimal or no active 
participation (R. 1-9). The Division alleged that Scarpa failed to meet the criteria of 
honesty, integrity and truthfulness which are required for certification (R. 3-4). It alleged 
that Scarpa was also subject to disciplinary action for attempting to procure certification 
by fraud or by making a false statement, submitting false information, or making a 
material misrepresentation in his application (R. 4). The petition asked the Board to 
deny Scarpa's application to become a certified residential appraiser, and to revoke his 
license to act as a registered appraiser (R. 4-5). 
At the hearing on the petition, the Division showed that Larsen had worked for 
Appraisal Professionals in November and December of 1992 (R. 1086 at 2-15). She 
performed appraisals on five properties while working there: 
2086 E. Kramer Drive, Sandy, Utah. Larsen performed the work on this 
appraisal, with the assistance of Gerald Higgs (R.1087 at 23 through R. 1088 at 1). 
She did not recall Scarpa doing any work on the appraisal (R. 1089 at 2-3). Before she 
finished the appraisal report, Scarpa instructed her to prepare an extra copy of the 
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appraisal report, to delete her name, and to add Scarpa's name and a place for him to 
sign (R. 1088 at 2 through R. 1089 at 1). The appraisal report on this property which 
was submitted to the lender is Exhibit 14. It is signed by Larsen and Higgs. The extra 
copy Larsen prepared for Scarpa is Exhibit 16. It is signed by Scarpa and Higgs. 
1995 East Rua Branco Circle, Sandy, Utah. Larsen performed the work on 
this appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1093 at 9-18). To her knowledge, 
Scarpa did not do any work on that appraisal (R. 1093 at 19-21). She prepared an 
extra copy of this appraisal for Scarpa's signature, as she had been previously 
instructed (R. 1093 at 22 through R. 1094 at 4). Larsen's copy of the appraisal report 
on this property, bearing the signatures of Larsen and Higgs, is Exhibit 3. The extra 
copy Larsen prepared for Scarpa, signed by Scarpa and Higgs, is Exhibit 4. 
462 West 1250 North, Centerville, Utah. Larsen performed the work on this 
appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1094 at 9-18.) To Larsen's knowledge, 
Scarpa may have suggested changing the word "remodeled" in describing the kitchen 
to the word "modified" (R. 1561 at 16 through R. 1564 at 3). Other than that, Larsen 
had no evidence or recollection of Scarpa doing any work on that appraisal (R. 1094 at 
23-25; R. 1564 at 15-20). She prepared an extra copy of this appraisal for Scarpa's 
signature, as Scarpa had previously instructed her (R. 1095 at 1-7). The copy of the 
appraisal report on this property which was sent to the lender is Exhibit 5. It bears only 
Higgs signature. Larsen did not know why her signature did not appear on that copy 
(R. 1095 at 15 through R. 1096 at 13). Larsen's personal copy of that report is Exhibit 
6. It is signed by Larsen and Higgs. The extra copy Larsen prepared for Scarpa is 
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Exhibit 7. It is signed by Scarpa and Higgs. 
2275 West 10546 South, South Jordan, Utah. Larsen performed the work on 
this appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1096 at 14-24). Scarpa provided Larsen 
with seme information from the builder (R. 1096 at 25 through 1097 at 5). He also may 
have suggested rephrasing three words in a sentence in the comments section, and 
changed two separate words in that same section (R. 1561 at 16 through R. 1563 at 13; 
R. 1564 at 4-14). Other than that, Larsen had no evidence or specific recollection of 
Scarpa performing any work on this appraisal (R. 1097 at 6-8; R. 1564 at 15-20). She 
prepared an extra copy of this appraisal for Scarpa's signature, as Scarpa had 
previously instructed her (R. 1097 at 9-15). The copy of the appraisal report on this 
property which was sent to the lender is Exhibit 8. It is signed by Larsen and Higgs. 
The extra copy Larsen prepared for Scarpa is Exhibit 10. It is signed by Scarpa and 
Higgs. 
876 South 2200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. Larsen performed the work on this 
appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1097 at 22 through R. 1098 at 6). Larsen 
could not recall specifically Scarpa performing any work on this appraisal (R. 1098 at 7-
10). She prepared an extra copy of this appraisal for Scarpa's signature, as Scarpa 
had previously instructed her (R. 1098 at 11-17). The copy of the appraisal report on 
this property which was sent to the lender is Exhibit 11 It is signed by Larsen and 
Higgs. The extra copy Larsen prepared for Scarpa is Exhibit 13. It is signed by Scarpa 
and Higgs. 
To Larsen's knowledge, Scarpa did not see any of the properties involved in her 
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five appraisals. She recalled that he probably contributed information to her or 
answered general questions she may have had in performing her appraisal work (R. 
1099 at 4-8). Scarpa claimed that he inspected the exterior of all five properties (R. 
1273 at 4-5). He admitted, however, that he did not inspect the interior of three of the 
properties, even though the copies he kept for himself and later submitted to the 
Division of those three appraisals contained his signed certification that he had 
inspected both the interior and exterior those properties (R. 1273 at 6-9; R. 1273 at 10-
21; R. 1231 at 25 through R. 1232 at 2; Exhibit 7; R. 1281 at 25 through R. 1282 at 14; 
R. 1239 at 1-2; Exhibit 13; R. 1283 at 16-22; Exhibit 16; R. 1258 at 24 through R. 1259 
at 9). 
Larsen left Appraisal Professionals because she was uncomfortable about the 
procedure involved in making the extra copy for Scarpa's signature (R. 1103 at 14-25). 
She was concerned because she was being asked to delete her name from that copy 
(R. 1104 at 23-25; R. 1119 at 11 through R. 1120 at 11). 
Richard Bybee was a registered appraiser who worked for Appraisal 
Professionals from about June 1992 to January 1993 (R. 1036 at 17 through 1038 at 5). 
At the hearing, Bybee bolstered Larsen's testimony by confirming that while he worked 
for Appraisal Professionals, Scarpa took credit for doing work on Bybee's appraisals, 
even though he performed little or no work on those appraisals (R. 1038 at 13-19). 
Bybee testified that "[Scarpa] signed all of mine. Every appraisal I did that was done for 
Appraisal Professionals there was a copy made with his signature on it." (R. 1043 at 
19-21). On between 20 and 50 of these appraisals, Scarpa did not see the properties 
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(R. 1043 at 22 through R. 1044 at 5). Bybee was concerned about the procedure of 
making an extra copy for Scarpa's signature because there came a point where in 
Bybee's opinion Scarpa "wasn't even looking at the appraisals." (R. 1038 at 23 through 
R. 1040 at 2, especially R. 1040 at 1-2). 
Bruce Warburton was a registered appraiser who worked for Appraisal 
Professionals from about September 1993 to September 1994. At the hearing, the 
Division showed that while working for Appraisal Professionals, Warburton performed 
three narrative appraisals: 
1359 West 5930 North, Oakley, Utah. Warburton performed the work on this 
appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1134 at 20 through R. 1137 at 2; R. 1144 at 
13 through R. 1145 at 4; R. 1171 at 16-18; Exhibit 19). After Warburton had compiled 
all of his notes and was ready to have the appraisal sent out to be typed, Scarpa 
instructed him to put Scarpa's name on the appraisal. Scarpa told him he was going to 
proof the appraisal, and that would give him the involvement needed to put his name on 
it. Scarpa told Warburton to do this because Scarpa was "the boss." Prior to that 
point, Scarpa had nothing to do with that appraisal. Warburton followed Scarpa's 
instructions, and when the appraisal was finished, he gave it Scarpa. Scarpa returned 
the appraisal to Warburton later that day. Scarpa signed that appraisal. (R. 1136 at 18 
through R. 1139 at 12). 
98 West Center Street, Midvale, Utah. Warburton performed the work on this 
appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1139 at 13 through R. 1140 at 2; Exhibit 20). 
Scarpa did not do any work on this appraisal (R. 1140 at 3-4). Pursuant to instructions 
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from Scarpa, Warburton put Scarpa's name on this appraisal and gave it to Scarpa to 
sign. Scarpa signed it in Warburton's presence. (R. 1140 at 5-23; Exhibit 20). 
548 East 12th Street, Ogden, Utah. Warburton performed the work on this 
appraisal, with the assistance of Higgs (R. 1140 at 24 through R. 1141 at 17; Exhibit 
21). Based on Scarpa's instructions on the previous two appraisals, Warburton added 
Scarpa's name to this appraisal (R. 1141 at 21 through R. 1142 at 124). To 
Warburton's knowledge, Scarpa did no work on this appraisal (R. 1142 at 4-7). Scarpa 
signed this appraisal in Warburton's presence (R. 1142 at 2-3). 
Scarpa presented evidence of his own, claiming he had been actively involved in 
all the appraisals performed by Larsen and Warburton. He attempted to contradict or 
discount the testimony of Larsen, Bybee and Warburton and to challenge their 
credibility.3 Ultimately, however, the Board resolved the dispute in the testimony in 
favor of the Division. It found that the Division proved by clear and convincing evidence 
that Scarpa did not provide significant professional assistance on the Higgs and 
Warburton appraisals as to allow him to claim credit for having performed any of them 
(R. 296; R. 301). 
3Scarpa attempted during the hearing to challenge Warburton's credibility by 
seeking to introduce extrinsic evidence of specific instances of alleged misconduct on 
his part. Counsel for the Division objected, and the administrative law judge sustained 
the objections. Scarpa then attached letters and affidavits to his request for 
reconsideration containing the kind of statements to which the Division successfully 
objected at the hearing. The Division objected to those letters and affidavits on 
reconsideration and asked the Board to ignore them (R. 242). None of the statements 
made in those letters or affidavits are mentioned in the order on reconsideration. 
Scarpa has made reference to those statements in his brief. The Division has filed a 
motion to strike all such references from Scarpa's brief. 
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Scarpa offered a number of reasons which he claimed justified his practice of 
having multiple copies of appraisals prepared, some with the signatures of one of his 
registered appraisers and Higgs, and one with the signature of himself and Higgs. For 
example, he said that certain lenders would only allow the certified appraiser to sign 
appraisals for them (R. 1228 at 23 through R. 1229 at 6). Even when doing an 
appraisal for a company that had no such requirement, however, Scarpa still had his 
appraisers prepare a separate copy for his signature in addition to the copies they 
signed themselves. Scarpa said there were so many lenders that it was "easier to have 
one procedure in the office." (R. 1278 at 22 through R. 1279 at 10). 
Scarpa also claimed that in establishing the procedure of preparing an extra 
copy of appraisals which would include his signature, he was only following the advice 
of Joe Dunlop, a certified general appraiser who was working for him as a consultant, 
and was just trying to create a record which showed his participation in the appraisals 
(R. 1276 at 10 through 1277 at 4; R. 1353 at 5-9; R. 1354 at 6-10). Dunlop testified, 
however, that he never advised Scarpa to delete from the appraisal the name of any 
registered appraiser from his office who had performed the appraisal (R. 1368 at 14-
18). Scarpa admitted that the idea of deleting the name of the other appraiser from his 
copy of the appraisal was his own interpretation of Dunlop's directions (R. 1277 at 5-
11). 
The Board was not persuaded that any of Scarpa's reasons justified him in 
submitting false statements to both lending institutions and the Division for varying 
purposes (R. 295-304, especially R. 299). In both its initial order, and its order on 
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reconsideration, the Board stated: 
Significantly, the appraisal report form submitted to lenders on 
those properties appraised by Ms. Larsen provides for the entry of the 
name(s) of each appraiser who may have conducted any given appraisal. 
If Respondent had actually joined Ms. Larsen or any other state-registered 
appraiser employed by Appraisal Professionals in conducting one of the 
appraisals in question, the appraisal report submitted to any given lending 
institution was necessarily inaccurate if it did not reflect the fact of 
Respondents significant professional assistance. Moreover, copies of 
appraisal reports which Respondent submitted to the Division to thus 
document his claim for experience toward certification as a state-certified 
residential appraiser were also inaccurate because he did not 
acknowledge the significant professional assistance provided by Ms. 
Larsen or any other appraiser in each instance. 
(R. 301) (Emphasis added by Board in its order on reconsideration). 
At the hearing, Teresa Larsen made reference to her working files which she had 
taken with her when she left Appraisal Professionals. These were files which belonged 
to her (R. 1562 at 15-22) She testified on rebuttal that on reviewing her working files on 
the five appraisals she performed, she found no indication that Scarpa had done any 
work on three of the appraisals (R. 1561 at 22 through R. 1563 at 12). She found some 
handwriting she did not recognize and said it could have been Scarpa's. Someone 
having that handwriting had asked that about six words be changed on the appraisals 
of the property located at 462 West 1250 North, Centerville, Utah, and 2275 West 
10546 South (R. 1563 at 5 through R. 1564). She testified that she had provided these 
working files to counsel for the Division several weeks before the hearing (R. 1567 at 5 
through R. 1568 at 12.) She also testified that from the time she left Appraisal 
Professionals in 1992 to the day she gave those files to counsel for the Division, neither 
the Division nor Scarpa, or anyone on their behalf, had contacted her to produce those 
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files (R. 1571 at 3-16). Scarpa testified that he had known Larsen had those working 
files since receiving correspondence from the Division requesting copies of those 
appraisals, which would have been November 1994, almost two years before the 
hearing (R. 276 at 4-15; Exhibit 17). Larsen had her working files with her during the 
hearing and reviewed them to respond to a question from counsel for the Division (R. 
300). The working papers themselves were neither offered nor received in evidence. 
Scarpa made no objection to Larsen's testimony about what she observed on 
reviewing her working files (R. 1561 at 22 through 1564 at 20). He did not request an 
opportunity to review those files. Throughout the entire hearing, he never raised any 
issue that the Division had allegedly violated discovery requirements by not giving him 
copies of the working files it obtained several weeks before the hearing. 
After the Board issued its original order and Scarpa requested reconsideration, 
he claimed for the first time that the Division was obligated under discovery 
requirements to provide him with the Larsen working papers, and that he was 
substantially prejudiced and denied due process because the Division did not provide 
him with those documents (R. 177-179; R. 272-274). On reconsideration, the Board did 
not address Scarpa's allegation that the Division was obligated under discovery 
requirements to provide him with those papers. Instead, it considered whether or not 
Scarpa had established he was prejudiced in his ability to present testimony in the case 
by not having those papers prior to the hearing (R. 300). It concluded that Scarpa had 
various opportunities-up to and including during the hearing itself—to obtain access to 
those documents (R.300). Scarpa failed, however, to avail himself of those 
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opportunities. The Board determined that since Scarpa's own admissions formed the 
lynchpin on which its original order was based, Scarpa had failed to establish that he 
was prejudiced by not having those documents prior to the hearing (R. 300).4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case involved a credibility contest. The Division presented evidence 
showing that Scarpa submitted an application for certification in which he tried to claim 
experience credit for work he did not perform. Scarpa presented evidence disputing the 
Division's position. The Board believed the Division's evidence and found that the 
Division had proved its case, not just by a preponderance of the evidence, but by a 
showing of clear and convincing evidence. It found that Scarpa's conduct was 
fraudulent, that he did not meet the criteria of honesty needed to become a certified 
appraiser, and that his license as a registered appraiser should be revoked. The 
Board's findings on these factual issues are supported by substantial evidence and this 
Court should not disturb them. 
The Board concluded that in order to receive experience credit for having 
4Scarpa asserts in his brief (on pages 13, 17, 18 and 43, for example) that 
Larsen's working files contained verification that he participated in her appraisals and 
would have refuted her testimony. There is nothing in the record to support this 
assertion. Weeks after the hearing had been concluded and the Board had issued its 
order, Scarpa attached letters and affidavits to his request for reconsideration in an 
attempt to make this assertion. The Division objected to those letters and affidavits on 
reconsideration and asked the Board to ignore them (R. 242). None of the statements 
made in those letters or affidavits are mentioned in the order on reconsideration. Those 
letters and affidavits are the subject of a motion to strike which the Division has filed 
with this Court. 
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performed an appraisal, an appraiser must have provided some significant professional 
assistance on the appraisal. It found that Scarpa did not provide that level of 
assistance on eight appraisals for which he claimed credit. Scarpa claims the Board 
should have adopted a formal rule before holding him to such a standard. He is wrong. 
It is not necessary to have an express rule for everything that might come before an 
agency. Existing rules already contain an implicit significant professional assistance 
requirement. In any event, the Board is authorized to interpret and apply standards of 
performance that should be understood by members of the profession. 
Scarpa's attempts to characterize the case as a mere difference of opinion about 
how he should have kept records of his participation on appraisals are misguided and 
irrelevant. This is not a case about the proper way to keep records of participation in 
appraisals. Rather, this case is about whether Scarpa participated sufficiently in certain 
appraisals to get credit in the first place. The Board found that he did not. 
The Board applied a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, as 
required by Department rule. Scarpa, while acknowledging that no statutory provision 
calls for a higher standard of proof, asserts that the Board should have applied a clear 
and convincing evidence standard. He fails to adequately brief the point, however, and 
cites no controlling authority that would support overturning the rule. In any event, 
even if the Board should have applied a clear and convincing evidence standard, there 
was no prejudice to Scarpa because the Board found that the proof satisfied both 
standards. 
Scarpa claims the Division violated discovery requirements by not providing him 
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with a copy of some documents it obtained from a witness several weeks before the 
hearing. By failing to timely raise that issue before the Board, however, he waived the 
right to have it considered on judicial review. Furthermore, because he had ample 
opportunity to timely discover that information himself from the witness early in the 
course of the proceeding, and could even have reviewed that information at the 
hearing, but did not, he was not prejudiced by not receiving a copy of that information 
from the Division. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE BOARD'S FINDING THAT 
SCARPA FRAUDULENTLY CLAIMED EXPERIENCE CREDIT FOR 
APPRAISALS ON WHICH HE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY SIGNIFICANT 
PROFESSIONAL ASSISTANCE 
The Board's finding that Scarpa fraudulently claimed experience credit for 
appraisals on which he did not provide any significant professional assistance should 
be sustained by this Court as long as it is "supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) 
(1993). Substantial evidence is "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is 
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First Natl Bank v. 
County Bd. of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163,1165 (Utah 1990). It is more than a mere 
"scintilla" of evidence and something less than the weight of the evidence. Johnson v. 
Board of Review. 842 P.2d 910t 911 (Utah App. 1992). 
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Appellate courts give great deference to the factual determinations of trial-level 
decision makers. As long as there is sufficient evidence to support the findings of the 
lower court, the appellate court will be mindful of the advantaged position of the trial 
judge who sees and hears the witnesses and will therefore give due deference to his 
decision. Jensen v. Brown. 639 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981). This principle applies to 
the decisions of trial courts and administrative agencies alike. An agency's findings of 
fact are accorded substantial deference and "will not be overturned if based on 
substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible." 
Stokes v. Board of Review. 832 P.2d 56, 60 (Utah App. 1992)(quoting Hurley v. Board 
of Review. 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988). "It is the province of the Board, not 
appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can 
be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences." 
Albertson's, Inc. v. Department of Emp. Sec. 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah App. 
1993)(quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 
1989)). 
This case presented a credibility contest to the Board. Witnesses for the Division 
testified that Scarpa took credit for performing appraisals on which he had little or no 
involvement. They demonstrated that in a number of cases, Scarpa caused a dual set 
of appraisal records to be established. One appraisal went to the lender, showing the 
names of the appraisers who actually performed the appraisal. A second version of the 
appraisal deleted the name of the registered appraiser who had done the work (Teresa 
Larsen) and substituted Scarpa's name. The application submitted by Scarpa to 
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become a certified residential appraiser claimed experience credit for some of the 
appraisals on which he had little or no involvement. The evidence offered by the 
Division, if accepted by the Board as truthful, was compelling and substantial. 
Scarpa, on the other hand, claimed that he had participated significantly in every 
appraisal he signed.5 He tried to attack the credibility of some of the Division's 
witnesses. He admitted maintaining the dual set of appraisal records, but tried to justify 
his actions with various explanations. He admitted signing a certification that he had 
inspected the interior of three of the properties appraised by Larsen, even though he 
had admittedly not really conducted such an inspection. 
After observing the witnesses and hearing their testimony, the Board believed 
the Division's witnesses, and not Scarpa's. Even though it would have been sufficient 
for the Board to find that the evidence preponderated against Scarpa, the Board found 
that the evidence against him was "clear and convincing."6 
Scarpa asserts that the Board should not have found his level of participation in 
5Some of the references in Scarpa's brief which purport to be references to 
evidence in the record are actually citations to the memoranda he submitted in support 
of his request for reconsideration. (See, for example, Scarpa's brief at page 20, where 
he cites to R. 178, pages 22-23, where he cites to R. 179, and page 42, where he cites 
to R. 266). The Division has made a motion to strike such references. 
6Since each appraisal for which Scarpa sought credit without having provided 
sufficient participation raised a serious concern respecting his honesty, integrity, 
truthfulness and moral character, the Board's finding that there were eight such 
appraisals was more than enough to support its finding that Scarpa should lose his 
license and be denied certification, even though his application listed hundreds of 
properties. The duplicate record scheme developed by Scarpa to facilitate this process 
further supported the Board's finding. 
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the subject appraisals was insufficient to receive experience credit because there was 
no statute or rule specifically defining the level of participation required to legitimately 
claim such credit. Actually, a review of the Division's rules in effect at the time of 
Scarpa's application for certification shows that even though the words "significant 
professional assistance" are not expressly stated, such a standard is implicit. The 
Appraisal Experience Points Schedule begins with the words "Appraisal Experience 
Points Schedule. Points shall be awarded as follows...." The schedule then lists 
various kinds of properties, each having a corresponding point value. Utah 
Administrative Code Rule R162-104-17 (1994), attached as Addendum D. Other rules 
point out that if the appraiser has done a desk review of the appraisal of the property, 
he earns 20% of the points for the appraisal. If he does a field review, he earns 50% of 
the points. If he supervises the appraiser, he earns 20% of the points for the appraisal. 
Utah Administrative Code Rule R162-104-9 (1994), attached as Addendum E. 
A reading of these rules strongly supports the Board's conclusion that in order to 
earn experience credit, an appraiser must provide significant professional assistance on 
an appraisal. The only cited rule which does not refer to some specific type of 
significant professional assistance by the appraiser (desk review, field review, or 
supervision) is the opening portion of the point schedule itself. However, since that 
schedule lists the maximum points available for an appraisal, and since the rules clearly 
provide that certain defined forms of participation in the appraisal will allow the 
appraiser to earn fewer points, it follows that to qualify for those maximum points, an 
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appraiser must provide some significant professional assistance.7 
Even if the rules did not already have an implicit requirement of significant 
professional assistance, it is not necessary for an agency to have a rule governing 
every issue that might come before it. Case law allows the Board to make appropriate 
interpretations of the rules. In Vance v. Fordham. 671 P.2d 124 (Utah 1983), the 
license of an osteopathic physician had been revoked for "unprofessional conduct." 
Among other things, the physician argued on appeal that it was illegal for the 
Department to revoke his license for unprofessional conduct when the Department had 
not published regulations defining what professional conduct was forbidden under that 
standard. The Supreme Court held that the Department's decision on the meaning of 
"unprofessional conduct" was within the limits of reasonableness, and upheld the 
revocation of the license. The Court reasoned that as applied to the treatment of 
patients, or services to clients, 
[A] general statutory standard like "unprofessional conduct" is acceptable 
for three reasons: (1) The subject of professional performance is too 
comprehensive to be codified in detail. (2) Members of a profession can 
properly be held to understand its standards of performance. (3) 
Standards of performance will be interpreted by members of the same 
profession in the process of administrative adjudication. 
Vance. 671 P.2d at 129. 
7On page 37 of his brief, Scarpa appears to argue that the Division should have 
questioned his claimed experience points in some informal manner instead of filing this 
formal proceeding. He is mistaken. Since the Division was seeking to deny Scarpa's 
initial certification application for a reason listed in Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-29, and to 
revoke his license to act as a registered appraiser, its rules required it to proceed by 
way of a formal administrative proceeding. Utah Administrative Code Rules R162-109-
1.1, 1.3 (1994) attached as Addendum F. 
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The principles followed by the Supreme Court in Vance also apply to this case. 
The Board concluded in its order on reconsideration that the term "significant 
professional assistance," while not defined by statute or rule, is a well recognized and 
commonly understood standard in the appraisal industry,8 members of the appraisal 
profession can be properly held to understand the various standards of performance 
which govern all appraisals, and the Board is entitled to apply and interpret that 
standard of performance in the process of administrative adjudication (R. 299-300).9 
The Board did not adopt a new rule in deciding this case, nor did it need to.10 
Instead, by applying commonly understood standards already recognized in the 
appraisal industry, it found that Scarpa did not provide significant professional 
assistance so as to claim credit for having performed any of the eight appraisals in 
question (R. 296).11 
8The Board found that "significant professional assistance is commonly accepted 
to mean that an appraiser has provided input into the final value estimate of the 
property in question." (R. 300). 
Accordingly, it was unnecessary for the Board to adopt the views of Scarpa's 
expert witness and former consultant Joe Dunlop regarding the level of participation he 
felt was necessary in order to qualify for experience credit on an appraisal. In addition, 
Dunlop's credibility was damaged by his admission on cross-examination that he had 
given incorrect advice to Scarpa about making an extra copy of appraisals for his 
signature (R. 1364 at 19 through R. 1368 at 13, especially R. 1368 at 11-13). 
10On page 36 of his brief, Scarpa says the Board did consider the issue of 
minimum criteria for participation "post decision," and refers to Addendum #3 of his 
brief. Addendum #3 consists of materials which are not part of the record, are irrelevant 
to this case and are a subject of the Division's motion to strike. 
"Scarpa's contention that the Board needed to formally enact on a rule on the 
subject before it could decide this case is incorrect. Vance. 671 P.2d at 128-30. 
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In Part IV of his argument, Scarpa claims, without any citation of relevant 
supporting authority, that the Board committed error by failing to make detailed findings 
of the evidence it relied on to support its conclusions.12 He is incorrect. The Board's 
findings of fact provide ample detail for this Court to carry out its review. It was not 
necessary for the Board to itemize the specific points of evidence on which it relied, in 
re Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d 969, 979 (Utah 1996). Most of Scarpa's argument on this 
point consists of self-serving assertions about the comparative strength of the evidence 
presented by the Division and by Scarpa. He fails to recognize that the Board saw and 
heard all of the witnesses and was able to assess their credibility and consider their 
testimony. He fails to recognize that it was the province of the Board determine which 
witnesses to believe. Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 
(Utah App. 1989). The Board performed its function of weighing the evidence and 
adequately explained the factual bases for its decision. This Court should ignore 
Scarpa's attempts to get this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Board in the 
determination of these factual issues. 
The Board's finding that Scarpa fraudulently claimed experience credit for 
appraisals on which he did not provide any significant professional assistance is based 
12One case Scarpa cites is Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments. Ltd.. 754 P.2d 89 
(Utah App. 1988). This was a negligence case based on injuries suffered when a 
snow-covered roof collapsed. The court granted a directed verdict in favor of the 
defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Scarpa cites this case for the proposition that 
"speculation and conjecture do not constitute the more 'credible evidence presented' 
based on an assumed, undefined, unpublished standard or test of'significant 
participation' or 'significant professional assistance.'" The case does not support 
Scarpa's assertion and has nothing to do with participation on an appraisal. 
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on substantial evidence and should be sustained by this Court.13 
POINT II 
SCARPA HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF HIS CHALLENGE TO 
THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE RULE REQUIRING THE 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD IN THIS CASE 
In deciding this case, the Board necessarily applied the standard of proof 
required by the rules of the Department of Commerce: The standard of proof in all 
proceedings under these rules, whether initiated by a notice of agency action or request 
for agency action, shall be a preponderance of the evidence." Utah Administrative 
Code Rule R151-46b-10(8) (October 1, 1996)(Effective March 4, 1996). (Emphasis 
added.) This rule was adopted by the Department "under the authority of Subsection 
63-46b-1(6) and Section 13-1-6 to define, clarify, or establish the procedures which 
13
 Scarpa argues in Point I of his brief that his procedure of making double copies 
of appraisals with differing signatures was simply an attempt to document his 
participation in appraisals while still satisfying lenders who would supposedly allow only 
the certified appraiser to sign an appraisal. He claims that at the time, the Uniform 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP"), had some potentially 
inconsistent requirements, and that he is being sanctioned over nothing more than an 
honest disagreement over how to document his experience while still complying with 
USPAP. (Since 1990, licensed appraisers have been required by Utah law to comply 
with USPAP. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2b-27 (Supp. 1990)) His argument lacks credibility 
because he admittedly used this procedure for lenders who imposed no such 
restriction, and because by causing the deletion of the name of the registered appraiser 
who performed the appraisal from his own copy, Scarpa went beyond the advice of his 
own consultant, Joe Dunlop. Most importantly, his argument fails because it is based 
on a false premise-that he provided significant professional assistance in the Larsen 
and Warburton appraisals. As the Board concluded, this case is not about whether 
Scarpa knew how to document his experience. It is about whether he earned the 
experience in the first place. The Board concluded he did not. 
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govern adjudicative proceedings before the department." Utah Administrative Code 
Rule R151-46b-3 (October 1, 1996)(Effective March 4, 1996). 
Utah law recognizes that "courts should uphold agency rules if they are 
reasonable and rational." Union Pacific R. v. Auditing Div.. 842 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 
1992). A properly adopted rule has the effect of law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-
2(16)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1996). It is presumed valid. See Horton v. Utah State Retirement 
Board. 842 P. 2d 928, 932, n. 2 (Utah App. 1992), and the cases cited therein. 
While conceding that no statutory provision calls for a higher standard of proof 
than that provided in the rule, Scarpa asserts that the Board erred in applying the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof in this case. He claims that the 
Board should have required the Division to prove its case by "clear and convincing 
evidence." Scarpa, in effect, is asking this Court to overturn Commerce Department 
RuleR151-46b-10(8). 
Rule 24(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure imposes the following burden on 
the parties as they brief issues on appeal: "The argument shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." A party who fails to meet 
this burden risks having the appellate court disregard issues which have not been 
sufficiently briefed. This court has routinely declined to consider arguments which are 
not adequately briefed on appeal." State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 
1992). 
The Board respectfully submits that Scarpa has failed to adequately brief his 
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challenge to its application of the preponderance of the evidence standard required by 
the rule. He has failed to meet his burden of challenging the constitutionality and 
validity of the rule. He cites no controlling case authority. His only Utah case reference 
in purported support of his claim is to dictum in the case of Harken Southwest 
Corporation v. Board of Oil. Gas and Mining. 920 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1996). He makes 
reference to statutes which are not relevant and do not support the generalized 
assertions for which he cites them (for example, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1993), 
which is part of the criminal code, and Utah Code Ann. §§ 68-3-11 and 68-3-12 (1993), 
which are part of the general rules of statutory construction). He offers no constitutional 
analysis. 
Scarpa has failed to adequately brief the burden of proof issue. The Court 
should decline to consider his challenge to the application of the Department's rule. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THE BOARD ERRED IN APPLYING THE PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
BECAUSE THE BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE PROOF OF 
SCARPA'S FRAUDULENT CONDUCT WAS SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY 
A CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD 
Although the Board concluded that the standard of proof which governed this 
proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence, it also concluded "that the quantum of 
evidence in this proceeding is sufficient to satisfy a 'clear and convincing' evidentiary 
standard." (R. 301). Accordingly, even if the Board erred in applying the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, the error was harmless because the Board 
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determined that it would have reached the same decision under either standard. Thus, 
Scarpa could not demonstrate substantial prejudice. Morton Intern.. Inc. v. Auditing 
Piv.. 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991). 
POINT IV 
SCARPA WAIVED ANY ARGUMENT THAT THE DIVISION DID NOT 
COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY REQUIREMENTS 
In Point V of his argument, Scarpa argues that the Division somehow violated 
discovery requirements by not providing him a copy of Larsen's working papers when it 
received them several weeks before the hearing.14 Scarpa failed to properly preserve 
this issue and has waived this argument on appeal. 
When Larsen testified at the hearing that she had given her working papers to 
the Division several weeks earlier, Scarpa was put on notice that this had happened. If 
14
 Although Scarpa waived the discovery issue on appeal by not raising it at the 
hearing, it is important to note that in his brief, Scarpa misrepresents the content of the 
record. He states on page 42 that 'The Division filed an Amended Witness and Exhibit 
List dated May 24, 1997, representing that it was in the process of obtaining Ms. 
Larsen's file with the appraisal reports on the five subject appraisals, including all the 
work papers and field notes. (R.00266)." (Emphasis added.) This cite is to the reply 
memorandum Scarpa filed in support of his request for reconsideration, not to the 
Division's witness and exhibit list. The Division's Amended Witness and Exhibit List 
actually reads as follows: 'The Division is in the process of obtaining from Teresa 
Larsen copies of her file copies of the appraisal reports on the following properties [the 
addresses of the five Larsen appraisals are here set forth]." (R. 110). There is no 
mention of work papers and field notes, just the appraisal reports themselves. Scarpa's 
misquotation from the record gives the false impression that the Division was in the 
process at that time of obtaining copies of Larsen's working papers for use as a 
possible exhibit, but such was not the case. Furthermore, the working papers were 
never received as an exhibit and are not part of the record on review. 
-34-
he had felt the Division had violated any discovery requirements by not providing him a 
copy of those papers, he needed to make a specific objection at that time. That would 
have given the Board an opportunity to deal with his objection at the hearing, while the 
Board, the parties, their counsel, and Teresa Larsen were present. If Scarpa had felt 
he had somehow been unfairly surprised and that he needed time to review the working 
papers, it was his burden to make a specific objection at that time and request 
appropriate relief, such as a recess, or even a continuance of the hearing, to give him 
an opportunity to review the papers, to cross examine Larsen about them and to 
present testimony of his own. He could have even asked the Board to keep the record 
open for a period of time and to permit him to present supplemental evidence. He did 
none of these things. At no time during the hearing did Scarpa raise the issue that the 
Division had violated discovery requirements by not providing him with those papers. 
Accordingly, he waived the right to have that issue considered on judicial review. As 
this Court held in Barney v. Utah Dept. of Commerce. 
Counsel did not timely object to the specific defects Barney now raises on 
appeal. Moreover, counsel failed to make a motion for relief, denying the 
administrative law judge any opportunity to remedy the defects. 
Therefore, we are unable to consider Barney's due process claims. 
Barnev. 885 P.2d at 809. Further, in Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. this Court held that 
"It is axiomatic in our adversary system that a party must raise an objection in an earlier 
proceeding or waive its right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings." 790 P.2d 
587, 589 (Utah App. 1990). 
When Scarpa submitted his request for reconsideration to the Board, he made a 
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belated attempt to raise the issue of the alleged violation of discovery requirements. It 
was within the sound discretion of the Board to decide whether to allow him to raise this 
issue on reconsideration,15 and it chose not to address that issue in its order on 
reconsideration. 
Since Scarpa failed to preserve the discovery issue, he has waived that 
argument on review and this Court should disregard it.16 
POINT V 
SCARPA WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE FACT THAT THE DIVISION 
DID NOT PROVIDE HIM WITH TERESA LARSEN'S WORKING 
PAPERS 
Even if Scarpa had preserved the issue below, he was not prejudiced by the fact 
that the Division did not provide him with Larsen's working papers before the hearing. 
In its order on reconsideration the Board, without discussing the merits of Scarpa's 
claim that the Division violated discovery rules, considered whether Scarpa had in any 
event been prejudiced by the fact that the Division did not provide him with Larsen's 
working files. It concluded as follows: 
15Since it is within the discretion of an administrative agency to grant or deny a 
request for reconsideration in the first place, it is certainly within its discretion to decide 
whether to reconsider one of several issues a party attempts to raise on 
reconsideration. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3) (1993) 
,6Even though Scarpa's waiver of this issue makes it unnecessary to discuss the 
merits of his argument, it is important to note that on page 3 of his brief, where he 
addresses the standard of review he believes applies, he cites the case of Semeco 
Industries v. State Tax Com'n. 849 P.2d 1167, 1172 (Utah 1993) without indicating that 
page 1172 of this case is part of the dissenting opinion. 
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Nevertheless, Respondent had an opportunity to inquire of Ms. Larsen as 
to the availability of those materials prior to the hearing and, if necessary, 
obtain a subpoena to compel production of those documents. More 
significantly, Ms. Larsen had the field notes and original work papers in 
her possession during the hearing in question and she reviewed those 
documents to respond to a question from Mr. Ferguson. Respondent-
through his counsel-thus had the opportunity to review those materials at 
that time, cross examine Ms. Larsen in that regard and also elicit 
testimony from Respondent as might have possibly been aided by his 
review of those documents. 
The Board thus concludes that no proper basis exists to now provide the 
field notes and original work papers to Respondent with a view toward any 
further supplemental proceedings in this case. Since Respondent's own 
admissions form the lynchpin on which the October 29, 1996 Order is 
based, the Board concludes that Respondent has not established he was 
prejudiced in any ability to present testimony in this case by reason of the 
fact that Ms. Larsen's field notes and original work papers were not 
available prior to the hearing. 
(R. 300). 
The Board was obviously convinced that since Scarpa had ample opportunity to 
obtain access to Larsen's working papers from November 1994 up through and 
including time of the hearing itself, and since it found that in any event his own 
admissions formed the crux of its findings against him, Scarpa was not prejudiced by 
the fact that the Division did not provide him with a copy of those papers after it 
received them some weeks before the hearing. 
For the same reasons, this Court should also conclude that Scarpa was not 
substantially prejudiced by the fact that the Division did not give him a copy of Larsen's 
working papers, and is thus not entitled to relief in this judicial review proceeding. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1993). 
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CONCLUSION 
Scarpa has failed to meet his burden on appeal. He is not entitled to any relief. 
The Board respectfully asks the Court to affirm its order on reconsideration. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of November, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
BLAINE R. FERGUSON U 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 3rd day of November, 1997,1 mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent to each of the following persons at the following 
addresses by first-class mail, postage prepaid: 
E. H. Fankhauser 
Attorney for Ronald Scarpa 
243 E 400 S, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Candice Ragsdale-Pollock 
Attorney for Ronald Scarpa 
254 W 400 S, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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By the Board: 
A September 9-10, 1996 hearing was conducted in the above-entitled proceeding before J. 
Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department cf Commerce, and the Real Esi. :e 
Appraiser Registration and Certification Board (hereinaftei tl|. Board members pre^f 
were Brad M. Lindley, Jam "> W Fauver, Dorothy M Ri milium and Jerry R Webber The 
in mi in iaining Board members, LeRoy Pia, Kevin Anderson and G. Edward Lear}', were abstiil 
1 in in III in in 1 in ,e was offered and received. 
I hr Board, being fully advised in the premises, now enters its Findings of Fact, 
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c o m p a n y w h i c h p r o v n l I ii| | i IIII ml i i i if*i i ml 1 I Ii|i i i i il ill i iiiililii 1 | in i ml II,| | i in i 
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time under review. Appraisal Professionals employed various state-registered appraisers between 
June 1992 and September 1994. 
2. Respondent submitted a November 9, 1994 application to the Division, seeking 
approval to take the examination for licensure as a state-certified residential appraiser. 
Respondent submitted an appraiser certification documentation form, which listed the various 
appraisals he purportedly conducted to satisfy the two-year experience requirement as a 
prerequisite to any certification as a state-certified residential appraiser. When Respondent 
submitted that form, he thus attested the information on the form was true. Respondent further 
attested that he understood he could be required to substantiate the claimed experience in question 
by submitting written reports or file memoranda and that willfully submitting false information 
could result in license revocation and/or criminal prosecution. 
3. Teresa Larsen was employed by Appraisal Professionals as a state-registered appraiser 
during November and December 1992. Based on the substantial and more credible evidence 
presented, Ms. Larsen conducted five appraisals between November 5, 1992 and December 1, 
1992 on properties at 1995 East Rua Branco Circle in Sandy, Utah; a Chase Lane condominium 
at 462 West 1250 North in Centerville, Utah; a home under construction at 2275 West 10546 
South in South Jordan, Utah; a residence at 876 South 2200 East in Salt Lake City, Utah; and a 
residence at 2086 E. Kramer Drive in Sandy, Utah. Mr. Higgs accompanied Ms. Larsen in her 
on-site inspection of those five properties and he conducted a review of her appraisal on each 
property. 
4. Respondent listed each of the just-referenced five appraisals on the experience 
documentation form which he submitted to the Division to obtain credit for possible certification 
as a state-certified residential appraiser. Based on the substantial and more credible evidence 
presented, Respondent did not personally inspect any of the properties in question incident to the 
appraisal of those properties by Ms. Larsen. Respondent provided some guidance to Ms. Larsen 
as to the appraisal procedure on one of the properties. He inserted some language on the 
appraisal report for one of the properties. Respondent also provided building plans to Ms. Larsen 
on one of the properties and he rephrased comments initially prepared by Ms. Larsen as to one of 
the appraisal reports in question. 
2 
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The appraisal reports on the above-referenced five properties which were appraised by 
Ms. Larsen were submitted to lenders and those reports accurately reflect Ms. Larsen as the 
appraiser who conducted those appraisals However, Respondent instrni foil Ms. Larsen tu prepare 
an additional copy of each appraisal which she had conducted. He also instructed Ms. Larsen lo 
delete her name and signature on those appraisals and then generate a document on each appraisal 
to reflect his name and signature as the appraiser who conducted those appraisals Respondent 
required those additional documents be prepared and he signed them to subsequently claim credit 
for having performed thu i apprais*il 
6 Bruce I ! <on was employed 1 A| | laisal Fiofessionals as i "-il ill -legisltrieJ 
appraiser from Sep >3 to September 1994, Based on the substantial and more credible 
evidence presented, Mr ^rburton and Mr. Higgs conducted three appraisals between January 
15, 1994 and May 2C n properties at 1359 West 5930 North in Oakley, Utah; an auto 
bod) shop and wic,-~ - Center Street in Midvale, Utah; and a chiropractic center at 
54? ^ast 12th Stri " ~ - . -*__. _.:.. :ngfc: «*.L. n . r .. ...... ., r 
inspection of those three properties, Mr. Warburton initial! :i sai report x ^ ** 
properties and he obtained guidance from Mr. Higp4 
Respondent listed each of the just-refen in nl (hn i 4\\\m^ih on the experience 
documentation form which he submitted to the I \\\ ISHHI lo nhirim <u ihl for possible certification 
a.* H state-certified residential appraiser, Respondent utniliit u.d a sepajate inspection of the lol * 
on which those three properties were located. However, Respondent did not conduct an interior 
inspection of each building on the property in question, Lu>|Jondent prepared a valuation of each 
property, which was used by Mr. Higgs—for comparison |j mouses—as to the appraisals prepan I 
by Mr. Warburton. Respondent suggested certain langiii iji i hanges on the appraisal repoils 
prepared by Mr. Warburton for two of the properties aim I III provided a sample narrative to Mi. 
Warburton lo assist the 1 HI In in In1 preparation nil I III iip]iiiihnil report' ontwooftho.se 
propi in I mi '. 
I The appraisal reports on the above-reference i I il I i tt properties involving Mr. 
Wail mi in I in in ill those appraisals were conducted by Mr, Nl iiillll iiiiiill ill I III Higgs and Respondent. 
Based on liit substantial and more credible evidence piu*uilul, ktjpundunt had instructed Mr. 
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Warburton to prepare those reports to reflect Respondent had joined Mr. Warburton and Mr. 
Higgs in conducting those appraisals. 
9. Based on the substantial and more credible evidence presented, Respondent frequently 
provided training and clerical assistance to Ms. Larsen, Mr. Warburton and the other state-
registered appraisers in the office. He also periodically supervised the work performed by those 
appraisers. However, Respondent did not provide significant professional assistance on any of the 
above-described five appraisals conducted by Ms. Larsen as to thus claim credit toward the 
experience required to possibly qualify for certification as a state-certified residential appraiser. 
Respondent also did not provide significant professional assistance in any of the three appraisals 
conducted by Mr. Warburton and Mr. Higgs as to thus claim credit toward the experience 
required to possibly qualify for certification as a state-certified residential appraiser. 
10. During the time under review, Respondent instructed both Ms. Larsen, Mr. 
Warburton and other state-registered appraisers in the office to prepare an additional copy of all 
appraisals which they had conducted. Respondent instructed each state-registered appraiser to 
then generate a document by routinely deleting the appraiser's name and signature on the copy of 
an appraisal report and then inserting his name and signature as the appraiser who conducted that 
appraisal. Based on the substantial and more credible evidence presented, Respondent frequently 
engaged in that practice to thus document his appraisal experience for purposes of his subsequent 
application for certification as a state-certified residential appraiser. Given the just-described 
office procedure, there is a lack of substantial and credible evidence Respondent conducted any 
other appraisal listed on the experience documentation form or otherwise provided significant 
professional assistance on each appraisal as to properly claim credit for certification as a state-
certified residential appraiser. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. §61-2b-16(1) provides an original certification may only be issued to a 
person "who is of good moral character". §61-2b-16(2) specifically provides: 
The board shall require and pass upon proof necessary to determine the honesty, 
competency, integrity, and truthfulness of each applicant. 
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Board finds and concludes Respondent has 
claimed experience credit for appraisals which were actually performed by other appraisers and 
4 
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Respondent provided no significant professional assistance in the performance of those appraisals 
as to qualify foi JIIIM) expenence credit. The Board further finds and concludes Respondent 
.;. ed file copies of certain appraisals to reflect his participation a5 tht appiajsei wlitiea* iho«r 
appraisals were actually performed by other state-registn i 1 ii| | i.ilsers employed by Respondent 
II I in in ugh Appraisal Professionals, 
U1! Hi. n Respondent submitted the documentation form as a predicate to possible certificate in 
as a state-certified residential appraiser, he attested under penalty of perjury and potential license 
revocation thnt tfn appraisal experience claimed on tht documentation form was; accural! Hi 1 
on a prep in I ranee of the evidence, the Board finds and concludes Respondent devised i 
III in I in ml in in il scheme in an attempt to obtain licensure as a state-certified residential appraise! I he 
I In,ii < I 11 nii finds and concludes Respondent has not established his honesty, integrity and 
Li ulJ il I in I in IIII J he thus lacks the necessary qualifications for such licensure. 
§61 -2b-29 further provides certain acts and omissions constitute unprofessional conduct 
u lu th shall be considered ground^ for disciplinary actinium i il 
(1) procuring or attempting to procure registration or certification under this 
:T by fraud or by making a false statement, submitting false information, makinp 
"'al misrepresentation in an application filed with the division 
The Board finds and concludes Respondent submitted false infoi mad m In the Division on 
his application for certification as a state-certified residential appraiM i | i i Really, Respondent 
improperly sought credit for experience on at least eight appraisals when he had not provided 
significant professional assistance in the performance of those appraisals. Moreover, Respondent 
engaged in a course of fraudulently devious conduct when he created false copies of appraisals 
II M I >rmed by state-registered appraisers in his employ to subsequent!) claim credit tor expem in k 
on those appraisals in his application for certification as a state-certified residential appraisn 
The Board thus finds and concludes a proper factual and legal basis exists to enter a discipline j 
sanction as to Respondent's license. 
f'he MM ml liiiil A\ 1 MM .vledges Respondent's testimony that certain lending institutions 
would not accept an appraisal report signed by two appraisrT if the appraisal was—in fac t -
conducted by more than one appraise? Nevertheless, the Luaid necessarily disregards 
Respondent's rather self-serving assert iun I hat such lending nrilitirtions ever required, requested or 
5 
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suggested that an appraisal report be submitted which did not accurately reflect when more than 
one appraiser had conducted that appraisal. 
Significantly, the appraisal report form submitted to lenders on those properties appraised 
by Ms. Larsen provides for the entry of the name(s) of each appraiser who may have conducted 
any given appraisal. If Respondent had actually joined Ms. Larsen or any other state-registered 
appraiser employed by Appraisal Professionals in conducting one of the appraisals in question, the 
appraisal report submitted to any given lending institution was necessarily inaccurate if it did not 
reflect the fact of Respondent's significant professional assistance. Moreover, copies of appraisal 
reports which Respondent submitted to the Division to thus document his claim for experience 
toward certification as a state-certified residential appraiser were also inaccurate because he did 
not acknowledge the significant professional assistance provided by Ms. Larsen or any other 
appraiser in each instance. 
Simply put, Respondent prompted the submission of appraisal reports to a lender which do 
not reflect that he provided any significant professional assistance in conducting those appraisals, 
yet Respondent now claims that he was so involved for purposes of obtaining credit toward 
certification as a state-certified residential appraiser. The gist of Respondent's testimony is that 
appraisals were submitted to certain lending institutions in violation of the uniform standards of 
professional appraisal practice when those appraisal reports did not accurately reflect all 
appraisers who provided significant professional assistance in conducting those appraisals. 
Respondent created false copies of appraisals and then submitted that information to the Division. 
The information thus submitted also fails to accurately reflect the appraisers who provided 
significant professional assistance on those appraisals. Essentially, Respondent engaged in 
unprofessional conduct in the practice of real estate appraising which constitutes dishonesty and 
fraud. See §61-2b-29(3). 
The Board necessarily concludes Respondent's entirely unwarranted and devious course of 
misconduct reveals that he lacks the qualifications for certification as a state-certified residential 
appraiser and also establishes a pattern of dishonest and fraudulent misconduct in the practice of 
real estate appraising. Given the serious and repeated nature of Respondent's misconduct, the 





WHFREFOKL II i ORDERED that Respondrnt^ i| plication for licensure as a sUic-
certified residential appraiser shall be denied 
It is further ordered that Respondent's license as a state-registered it J estate appraisei ski 
be revoked. Said revocation shall be effective thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. 
Dated this ^ 7 ^ d a y of October, 1996. 
M. Lindl^v 
Dorothy M/ Burnham 
Jerry RQ Webber 
Agency reconsideration of this Order may be obtained by filing a request for such review 
* 1 (he Board within twenty (20) days after the issuance of this Order. Any such request miLl 
comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann §63-46b-13 and Rl51-46b-13. 
017? 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on the ^ / ~riay of October, 1996, a copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was sent, by regular mail, postage prepaid, 
to Blaine R. Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, P. O. Box 140872, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872 and E. H. Fankhauser, Attorney for Respondent, 243 East 
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. A copy of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order was also hand delivered to Shelley K. Wismer, Staff Legal 





. i H t REAL i_ ATE APPRAISER 
Ri vTlON AND CERTIFICATION BOARD 
i ~ COMMERCE 
H 
In the Matter of the License of 
h oiittld J. Scarpa to Act as a ORDER ON REQUEST FOR 
Registered Real Estate Appraiser VGENCY RECONSIDERATION 
and to Become a Certified Real • Case No, AP94-11-18 
Estate Appraiser ; 
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II I fc an October 29, 1996 Order, Respon I m's application foi licensure as a 
slafi certified residential appraiser was denied kitHI OU I I*« *pondent's license as a state-
rtjtM' lured real estate appraiser was revoked. The revnn i m was to become effective thirty 
(10» days from the date of the October 29, 1996 Order. 
Respondent filed a November IS 1996 request for agency reconsideration of the 
Ortober 29, 1996 Onln Ihr Di\ision filed a Dn mibn R 1996 response and a final iqih 




 ard reviewed the just-stated submissions and determined no oral argument 
would be necessary or beneficial to address the issues raised in Respondent's request for 
agency reconsideration ,rdingly, the Court conducted a January 16, 1997 telephone 
conference with Biam F ,;uson, counsel for the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, and E. EL Fankhauser, counsel for Respondent i he Court thus informed 
re pective counsel no oral argument would be presented and the Board would conduct 
iltliberations as tt OR pending request for agency reconsideration on January 21, 1997. 
However, one of the four Board members who are participating in this case was not 
available on the just-stated ilitr 1 k Louil thus contacted respective counsel on January 22, 
pmj and informed counsel that the Board would meet in hh Januai> I1***r If iddiess the 
I muling request Hit Court subsequently informed respective counsel that Board deliberations 
nntild be conducted on January 30, 1997 and a decision on Respondent's request for agencv 
reconsideration w uM issue within twenty (20) days thereaflu 
Tht Hoard, In UIJL lull) I .1 ill jiipmi^ now enters the following Supplemental 
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and Modified Findings of Fact, Accompanying Conclusions of Law and Order. The Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law—initially set forth in the October 29, 1997 Order-are 
otherwise reaffirmed and incorporated herein by reference. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent's own testimony clearly and convincingly establishes that he knowingly 
submitted false appraisal reports to lending institutions. Specifically, those reports did not 
reflect all appraisers who had purportedly conducted those appraisals. 
2. Respondent's own testimony clearly and convincingly establishes he submitted 
altered copies of five appraisal reports to the Division as to obtain credit toward possible 
certification as a certified real estate appraiser. Specifically, those copies did not accurately 
reflect that the appraisals had been performed by Ms. Larsen. Moreover, those appraisal 
reports contain a certification that Respondent had conducted an interior and exterior 
inspection of the subject property when—in fact—he never performed such an inspection. 
Respondent thus knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that he had conducted a complete 
inspection of the five subject properties. 
3. Respondent did not conduct a complete personal inspection of the three buildings 
which were the subject of the appraisals performed by Mr. Warburton and Mr. Higgs. 
Moreover, the valuation Respondent prepared for one of those properties was not used to 
prepare the appraisal report for that property. Rather, Respondent made that valuation after 
Mr. Warburton had appraised the property and did so solely for comparative purposes to 
enable Mr. Higgs to review the appraisal which had been completed by Mr. Warburton. 
4. There is no substantial evidence Respondent provided significant professional 
assistance to either Ms. Larsen or Mr. Warburton as to appraisals performed on the eight 
properties in question. Respondent periodically provided guidance on appraisal procedures to 
other appraisers employed by Appraisal Professionals. He also periodically provided clerical 
assistance and background information on properties or made grammatical changes on 
appraisal reports. However, the just-described work does not constitute significant 
professional assistance as to claim credit for having performed any of the eight appraisals in 
question. 
MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Based on the Board's recollection of the evidence presented during the September 
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9 111 1996 hearing and a review of the arguments submitted by respective counsel on 
Respondent's request for agency reconsideration, the Board finds and concludes there is no 
substantial evidence to sustain the iuiding-iiutidll> eiUuui I illit Buanlll in Paragraph IJ uf 
the October 29, 1996 Order-that Respondent failed to condiu I an> othei appraisal listed on 
the experience documentation form which was submitted to the Division The Board similar!) 
I I > and concludes there is no substantial evidence to sustain the related finding that 
I indent otherwise failed to provide significant professional assistance on the remaining 
appraisals as in piopeil) t him credit for certification as a stdl<'-certified residential appraisu. 
" The Board erred when it made the just-described misuppt 11< <1 finding 
Specifically the Board improperly speculated whether Respondent should receive uedil I i 
nili< i appraisals beyond the eight appraisals directly in question relative to this proceeding 
Accordingly, the Board's findings regarding any other appraisals are hereby vacated. Siiri] hm 
pul any issue as to credit for other appraisals was not properly before the Board in this 
proceeding. 
t i l ill »i«ri I i'l 11 if !""' i'i ill ill ' '" ' 
PPqiondent contends specific grounds exist to warrai I Ifn reversal ot the October 29% 
1 Order. Respondent thus asserts a new hearing should be granted on numerous matei M! 
Specifically, he urges: (1) there is no sufficient and credible evidence he did not 
substantially participate in the eight appraisals under review, (2) no statute or rule establishes 
n "significant professional assistance test" and, hence, the Board impiuperl) applied that 
I hn1 in this proceeding and (3) the Division failed to disclose to Respondent thai Hr 
Larsen had the field notes and original work papers as to the five appraisals in question and 
ondent was thus prejudiced in his ability to establish the nature of his participation on 
llius i 1 
Respondent furthei asserts 11 o statute or rule prescribes the method whereby an 
i| | mi iir^ j in tr document participation uu an appraisal an'1 «J-«">< ir< luidantt, Respondent 
has properly documented the work he fperformed as to re^,. .redit toward possible 
lication as a residential appraiser; I I I lie Board applied an erroneous standard of proof to 
1
 I he had engaged in fraudulent misconduct, the proper standard being that of clear and 
convincing evidence (!) the Eloard has abused its discretion and—without any sufficient 
evidence—has speculated d 1 i VIIK tin i Ki |M mli I I performi il other appraisal* llHf I i the 
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experience documentation form, thus giving rise to the appearance of bias against Respondent; 
and (4) Respondent was improperly limited in his ability to call witnesses sufficient to refute 
the credibility of adverse witnesses and he was thus denied due process. 
Two procedural issues should be initially addressed. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-
13(l)(a) provides any party may file a written request for reconsideration with the agency and 
is thus required to state "the specific grounds upon which relief is requested". The Division 
correctly asserts no Utah statute or rule sets forth the grounds which must be invoked as to 
prompt agency reconsideration. However, Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
sets forth those grounds which may justify granting a new trial, taking additional testimony, 
amending findings of fact and conclusions of law, making new findings or conclusions and 
directing the entry of a new judgment. The Board duly acknowledges R151-46b-5(3), which 
provides: 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and case law thereunder may be 
looked to as persuasive authority upon these rules, but shall not, except as 
otherwise provided by Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, or 
by these rules, be considered controlling authority. 
The Division accurately asserts that the "specific grounds"—alluded to in §63-46b-
13(l)(a)--should be those expressly set forth in Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Respondent has invoked various provisions of that rule in his request for agency 
reconsideration. Accordingly, the Board readily acknowledges Respondent has adequately 
identified the grounds upon which relief is now requested. 
The Division asserts Respondent has not provided a transcript of the September 9-10, 
1996 hearing. The Division thus contends the Board should necessarily disregard any 
challenges to findings based on an alleged insufficiency of evidence to support those findings. 
Rl 51-46b-13 sets forth the rules which govern agency reconsideration. Significantly, those 
rules do not require that the record of the hearing be submitted with any citations to that 
record regarding any challenged findings of fact. Rl 51-46b-12, which governs agency 
review, expressly requires the preparation and submission of a transcript if the grounds for 
agency review include any challenge to a determination of fact or conclusion of law as 
unsupported by or contrary to the evidence. See R151-46b-12(3)(c) and (d). 
Since Rl 51-46b-13 does not require a transcript be filed, the Board necessarily rejects 
the Division's contention that Respondent's challenge to any finding based on an alleged 
4 
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fTLiency of the evidence should be either ignored or summarily rejected smipl) because 
I'. "pondent has not provided a transcript of the hearing. Accordingly, I Iff1 H nr I In 
s^sed the issues thus raised by Respondent based on the Board's J ion of the 
testinioii) presented during the September 9-10, 1996 hearing Conceded!), Respondent's 
assertions and the Board's review of those issues would hau been necessarily aidtd b> tin 
>ion of a transcript Beyond the modified fundings ot fact set forth above, the Board 
ludes Respondent has failed to sustain his burden of establishing the evidence is not 
*uiiicient to support any other findings entered by the Boai i I 
Mi iiu illistanding Respondent's belabored arguments as to whether he substantially 
pailiupated in tb eight appraisals fi i whit 1 IM litis souglil n dil, the crux of this case lies in 
Respondent's own testimony that he submitted appraisal reports to lending institutions which 
I I not reflect his purported participation as an appraiser with respect to those properties and 
he submitted altered copies of appraisal reports to the Division In < I lain credit toward state 
nTlification as a residential appraiser when those reports did not reflect that Ms. Larsen or 
Mi i dil in ton had perfoiioed those respective appraisals Beyond the substantial and 
credible testimony offered by an> nlhw witness, Respondenl s uv\n admissions clearly 
11i h that he submitted false statements to both lending institutions and the Division lor 
m mg purposes. 
1 he Board reiterates there is ample evidence I 11 iid and conclude Respondent did not 
substantially participate in the five Larsen appraisals or the three Warburton appraisals. The 
Board acknowledges no M-iftid MI IIIII establishes a "significant professional assistance test" as 
to govern when an appraiser can properly obtain credit on work allegedly performed during 
the course of an appraisal Nevertheless, USPAP Standard Rule 2-3 specifically requires that 
all significant professional assistance be acknowledged on an appraisal repnil It is undisputed 
I Respondent failed ii inply with that standard when he submitted the appraisal reporl 
HI question to certain lending institutions and then submitted altered file copies of those same 
reports to the Division m to obtain credit I \\ . iihli certification UL» j residential appraiser. 
1
"
 ur>ard notes Respondent's testimony that he meiel) complied with purported 
i". -.-* v- Horn various lending institutions and that he acted on the advice of Mr, Dunlop as 
U . i subsequently document whatever he may have done during the course ol a 
pivn .ifi|ir ii i i rthcless, USPAP Standard Rule 2-3 governs every appraisal repoit 
0299 
submitted to a lending institution. Moreover, the Board concludes there is no justification to 
excuse the fact that Respondent fraudulently submitted altered copies of appraisal reports to 
the Division which did not reflect that another appraiser had performed those appraisals. 
Significant professional assistance, while not defined by statute or rule, is a well 
recognized and commonly understood standard in the appraisal industry. Simply put, 
significant professional assistance is commonly accepted to mean that an appraiser has 
provided input into the final value estimate of the property in question. The Board reiterates 
that instructing a fellow appraiser as to appraisal procedures, providing clerical assistance or 
background information and making grammatical corrections in appraisal reports does not 
constitute significant professional assistance within the meaning of the above-described 
standard. Clearly, members of the appraisal profession can be properly held to understand the 
various standards of performance which govern all appraisals. Moreover, such standards of 
performance can be properly applied and interpreted by members of this Board in the process 
of administrative adjudication. See Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 129 (Utah 1983). 
The Board acknowledges the Division did not provide Ms. Larsen9 s field notes and 
original work papers to Respondent prior to the hearing as to the five appraisals in question. 
Nevertheless, Respondent had an opportunity to inquire of Ms. Larsen as to the availability of 
those materials prior to the hearing and, if necessary, obtain a subpoena to compel production 
of those documents. More significantly, Ms. Larsen had the field notes and original work 
papers in her possession during the hearing in question and she reviewed those documents to 
respond to a question from Mr. Ferguson. Respondent-through his counsel-thus had the 
opportunity to review those materials at that time, cross examine Ms. Larsen in that regard 
and also elicit testimony from Respondent as might have possibly been aided by his review of 
those documents. 
The Board thus concludes no proper basis exists to now provide the field notes and 
original work papers to Respondent with a view toward any further supplemental proceedings 
in this case. Since Respondent's own admissions form the lynchpin on which the October 29, 
1996 Order is based, the Board concludes that Respondent has not established he was 
prejudiced in any ability to present testimony in this case by reason of the fact that Ms. 
Larsen9 s field notes and original work papers were not available prior to the hearing. 
Respondent accurately asserts no statute or rule prescribes the method by which an 
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iippiaiser is to document participation in an appraisal as to potentially receive credit toward 
p, u.iihle certification, However, Respondent clearly misrepresented the manner in which the 
eight appraisals had been 11 riormed when he failed to provide documentation to the Division 
which reflected the fact that both Ms Larsen and rvii }\ arbmrtnii ki 1 participated in the 
appiaisals in question. The Board reiterates the following conclusions of law, previously set 
forth in its October 29, 1996 Order: 
Significantly, the appraisal report form submitted to lenders on those 
properties appraised by Ms. Larsen provides for the entry of the name(s) of 
each appraiser who may have conducted any given appraisal. If Respondent 
had actually joined Ms. Larsen or any other state-registered appraiser 
employed by Appraisal Professionals in conducting one of the appraisals in 
question, the appraisal report submitted to any given lending institution was 
necessarily inaccurate if it did not reflect the fact of Respondent's significant 
professional assistance. Moreover, copies of appraisal reports which 
Respondent submitted to the Division to thus document his claim for 
experience toward certification as a state-certified residential appraiser were 
also inaccurate because he did not acknowledge the significant professional 
assistance provided by Ms. Larsen or any other appraiser in each instance. 
(All emphasis herein added). 
The issue is not whether Respondent knew how to document his experience. Rather, 
Respondent elected to do so by fraudulent means with the intended purposes of insuring that 
d]j|)iaisals would be approved by lending institutions and he would also subsequently receive 
credit ior those appraisals ds to obtain certification as a residential appraiser. 
Hit Board reiterates that the undisputed testknoii) • iiuiiicall) uJlered b) Respondent 
himself—provides clear and convincing evidence that he devised a fraudulent scheme in an 
aflempt to obtain licensure as a state-certified residential appraiser. Moreover, there is also 
I in and convincing evidence Respondent engaged in a course of fraudulently devious 
in I met when he created false copies of appraisals performed by state-registered appraisers in 
his emplin lb > >ubsequenll i Mm credit for experience on those appraisals in his application 
for certification as a state-certified residential appraisei. 
Notwithstanding this Board's conclusion tktl tin i|ii nil in no ol utidcik L iiii iliiiis 
I in ceding is sufficient to satisfy a "clear and coin inn nit" i in lentiary standard, the Board 
(in mi in (11 er concludes that the standard of proof whicli g^  i \ i, 111 f 111 proceeding in all respects is a 
preponderance of the evidrtrr R151-46b-10 governs all hearings held in departmental 
adpidicative proceedings P h i 4hb 10(K) ,,., •, , 
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The standard of proof in all proceedings under these rules, whether 
initiated by a notice of agency action or a request for agency action, shall be a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that the standard of proof generally 
applicable to proceedings before administrative agencies is one of a "preponderance of the 
evidence". Harken Southwest Corporation v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 
1182 (Utah 1996). The Harken Court thus concluded that the correct standard of proof (i.e., 
preponderance of the evidence) had been properly applied in that case. Concededly, the 
Harken decision includes the following passage: 
Absent an allegation of fraud or a statute or a court rule requiring the 
higher standard, the standard of proof in administrative proceedings is a 
preponderance of the evidence. In re D'Angelo, 105 N.M. 391, 393, 733 P.2d 
360, 362 (1986). 
Significantly, the just-quoted language is dictum, given the Court's analysis of the applicable 
quantum of evidence and the nature of the allegations in the Harken case. 
Accordingly, this Board concludes the Harken decision does not establish that the 
standard of proof for allegations of fraud in an administrative adjudicatory proceeding is clear 
and convincing evidence. This Board acknowledges the just-stated standard generally applies 
when fraud claims are asserted in a civil action. See Utah State Department of Social 
Services v. Pierren, 619 P.2d 1380, 1381-82 (Utah 1980); Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 
871 P.2d 1041, 1046-47 (Utah App. 1994). However, the Board further notes the usual 
standard of proof in both attorney and judicial discipline proceedings is a preponderance of 
the evidence. See In re Worthen, 302 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 11 (1996). 
Respondent has provided no legal authority from the courts of this state to support his 
assertion that allegations of fraud in an adjudicative proceeding conducted pursuant to the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The 
governing department rule has no such provision. Moreover, the courts of this state have not 
engrafted any such requirement on the standard of proof applicable in attorney or judicial 
discipline proceedings. Absent unequivocal direction from the courts of this state, this Board 
necessarily concludes any allegations of fraudulent misconduct in this proceeding may be 
properly established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The Board concurs with both the Division and Respondent that the Board erred when 
it entered any findings as to other appraisals which were not within the scope of the 
8 
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allegations of this proceeding. Based on the modified Findings of Fact previously set forth 
herein, the Board necessarily disregards Respondent's implicit assertion there is any evidence 
the Board was biased or prejudiced against Respondent in this proceeding. 
The Board further concludes that Respondent had a fair opportunity to present 
evidence in this proceeding which was neither repetitive nor cumulative. Significantly, 
Respondent presented testimony from eleven witnesses over the course of the two-day 
hearing. The Board concludes Respondent was not improperly limited in his ability to both 
present the relevant and material evidence in support of his various defenses in this 
proceeding and also challenge the credibility of any adverse witness. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED no proper factual or legal basis exists to conduct a 
new hearing or any further proceedings in this case. The Board has reconsidered its October 
29, 1996 Order in light of the issues presented by Respondent. Beyond entry of the matters 
set forth herein, the Board concludes no further relief is warranted. The October 29, 1996 
Order shall thus become effective thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. 
Dated this day of February, 1996. 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained pursuant to §63-46b-14 and §63-46b-16, 
consistent with the provisions of those statutes. 
9 
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By the Administrative Law Judge: 
The Court conducted a February 20, 1997 telephonic conference with Blaine R. Ferguson, 
counsel for the Division of Real Estate, and E. H. Fankhauser, counsel for Respondent. The 
Court thus informed respective counsel that three Board members (Brad M. Lindley, Dorothy 
M. Burnham, and Jerry R. Webber) signed the foregoing Order on February 20, 1997. The 
Court further informed respective counsel that the remaining Board member participating in 
this case (James W. Fauver) was initially expected to sign the Order on that date, but he 
would not be available to do so for one week. 
Accordingly, the Court and respective counsel agreed the Order would be issued-with 
Mr. Fauver's signature—on February 27, 1997. Moreover, it was further agreed and the Court 
so ordered that the time to file any petition for judicial review would not commence until 
thirty (30) days from the issuance of the Order, as opposed to the February 20, 1997 date 
initially entered on the Order. 
Dated this of February, 1997. 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on the XT "^day of February, 1997, a copy of the foregoing Order 
on Request for Agency Reconsideration was sent, by regular mail, postage prepaid, to Blaine 
R. Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, P. O. Box 140872, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0872 and E. H. Fankhauser, Attorney for Respondent, 243 East 400 South, 
Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. A copy of the Order on Request for Agency 
Reconsideration was also hand delivered to Shelley K. Wismer, Staff Legal Counsel, Division 
of Real Estate. 





BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISER 
REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATION BOARD 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License of : 
Ronald J. Scarpa to Act as a : NOTICE OF POSTHEARING CONFERENCE 
Registered Real Estate Appraiser : AND ENTRY OF NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER 
and to Become a Certified Real : Case No. AP94-11-18 
Estate Appraiser : 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
The Order on Respondent's Request for Agency Reconsideration in the above-entitled 
proceeding was issued February 27, 1997. This Court issued a February 27, 1997 addendum to 
that Order, which recites the time to file any petition for agency review would not commence 
until thirty (30) days from the issuance of the Order. 
The Division of Real Estate filed a March 7, 1997 motion, requesting entry of an order 
to clarify that: (1) the October 29, 1996 Order initially entered by the Board would become 
affective thirty (30) days after the issuance of the February 27, 1997 Order on Request for 
Agency Reconsideration; and (2) any petition for judicial review must be filed within thirty (30) 
days after February 27, 1997. The Court thus conducted a March 11, 1997 telephonic post-
hearing conference with Blaine R. Ferguson, counsel for the Division of Real Estate and E. H. 
Fankhauser, counsel for Respondent. 
There is a significant omission in this Court's February 27, 1997 addendum to the 
Board's Order on Request for Agency Reconsideration. Further, that addendum contains a 
clerical error. Specifically, the addendum should have included a provision that the October 29, 
1996 Order would become effective thirty (30) days after the issuance of the February 27, 1997 
Order on Request for Agency Reconsideration. Moreover, the addendum should have provided 
that any petition for judicial review must be filed within the same time. Accordingly, the Court 
informed respective counsel that the Court would enter a nunc pro tunc order to correct the 
February 27, 1997 addendum and clarify the just-described issues. 
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ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the October 29, 1996 Order shall become effective on 
March 31, 1997. Any petition for judicial review of that Order or the February 27, 1997 Order 
on Request for Agency Reconsideration shall be filed no later than March 31, 1997. 
The Order on Request for Agency Reconsideration also contains a clerical error. 
Specifically, that Order recites its date as February 20, 1996. However, the correct date is 
February 27, 1997 as reflected in this Court's February 27, 1997 addendum. 
Dated this / g ^ * d a y of March, 1997. 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on the f<^ ~ day of March, 1997, a copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Posthearing Conference and Entry of Nunc Pro Tunc Order was sent, by regular mail, postage 
prepaid, to Blaine R. Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, P. O. Box 
140872, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872 and E. H. Fankhauser, Attorney for Respondent, 243 
East 400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. A copy of the Notice of Posthearing 
Conference and Entry of Nunc Pro Tunc Order was also hand delivered to Shelley K. Wismer, 
Staff Legal Counsel, Division of Real Estate. 




467 REAL ESTATE R162-104-17 
dards Rule 6 of the Uniform Standards of Profes-
sional Appraisal Practice. 
R162-104-13. Unacceptable Experience. 
104.13. Unacceptable experience. An applicant will 
not receive points toward satisfying the experience 
requirement for registration or certification for per-
forming the following: 
(a) Appraisals of the value of a business as distin-
guished from the appraisal of commercial real estate; 
or 
(b) Personal property appraisals. 
R162-104-14. Verification of Experience. 
104.14. Verification of experience. The Board, at its 
discretion, may verify the claimed experience by any 
of the following methods: Verification with the cli-
ents; Submission of selected reports to the Board; and 
Field inspection of reports identified by the applicant 
at the applicant's office during normal business 
hours. 
R162-104-15. Experience Review Committee. 
104.15. Experience Review Committee. There may 
be a committee appointed by the Board to review the 
experience claimed by applicants for certification. 
104.15.1. The Committee shall: 
104.15.1.1. Review all applications for adherence to 
the experience required for certification; 
304J5J..2, Correspond with applicants concerning 
submissions, if necessary; and 
104 15.1.3. Make recommendations to the Division 
and the Board for certification approval or disap-
proval. 
104.15.2. Committee composition. The Committee 
shall be composed of appraisers from the following 
categories: Residential appraisers; commercial ap-
praisers; farm and ranch appraisers; right-of-way ap-
praisers; and ad valorem appraisers. 
104.15.2.1. The chairperson of the committee shall 
be appointed by the Board. 
104.15.2.2. Meetings may be called upon the re-
quest of the chairperson or upon the written request 
of a quorum of committee members. 
104.15.3. Reconsideration. If the review of an appli-
cation has been performed by the Experience Review 
Committee, and the Board has denied the application 
based on insufficient experience, the applicant may 
request that the Board reconsider the application by 
making a written request within ten days after the 
denial stating specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. The Board shall thereafter consider the 
request and issue a written decision. 
R162-104-16. Special Circumstances. 
104.16. Special Circumstances. Applicants having 
experience in categories other than those shown on 
the Appraisal Experience Points Schedule, or appli-
cants who believe the Experience Points Schedule 
does not adequately reflect their experience, or appli-
cants who believe the Experience Points Schedule 
does not adequately reflect the complexity or time 
spent on an appraisal, may petition the Board on an 
individual basis for evaluation and approval of their 
experience as being substantially equivalent to that 
required for certification. Upon a finding that an ap-
plicant's experience is substantially equivalent to 
that required for certification, the Board may waive 
experience points, give an applicant credit for months 
cf experience, or both. 
R162-104-17. Appraisal Experience Points 
Schedule. 
104.17. Appraisal Experience Points Schedule. 
Points shall be awarded as follows: 
104.17.1. Residential Experience Points Schedule. 
The following points shall be awarded to form ap-
praisals. Three points may be added to the points 
shown if the appraisal was a narrative appraisal in-
stead of a form appraisal. 
TABLE 1 
(a) One unit dwelling (including a ate) 
(b) Two to four unit dwellings 
(c) Employee Relocation Counsel reports 
completed on currently accepted 
Employee Relocation Counsel 
form 
(d) Residential lot, (1-4 family) 
<e) Small parcel up to 5 acres 
(f) Vacant land, 20-500 acres 
nuiTimiitn 50 points 
(g) Recreational, farm, or timber acreage 
suitable for a house site 
up to 10 acres 
Over 10 acres 
(h) All other unusual structures or acreages, 
which are much larger or more complex 
than typical properties 
d) Residential appraisal textbook authorship 
not to exceed 20 points per year 
(j) Residential appraisal articles in journals of 
approved national appraisal organizations, 
not to exceed 20 points per year 
(k) Instructing an approved residential course 











by the Board 
As determined 
by the Board 
10 points 
10 points 
104.17.2. General Experience Points Schedule. All 
appraisal reports claimed must be narrative ap-
praisal reports. 
TABLE 2 
(a) Apartments, 5-100 units 
over 100 units 
(b) Hotel or motels, 50 units or less 
51-150 units 
Over 150 units 
(c) Nursing home, rest home, care facilities, 
Less than 80 beds 
Over 80 beds 
(d) Industrial or warehouse building, 
Less than 20,000 square feet 
Over 20,000 square feet, amgle tenant 
Over 20,000 square feet, multiple tenants 
(e) Office buildings 
Leas than 10,000 square feet 
Over 10,000 square feet, single tenant 
Over 10,000 square feet, multiple tenants 
(0 Condominiums, using income approach 
to value 
5 to 30 units 
31 or more units 
(g) Retail buildings 
Less than 10,000 square feet 
More than 10,000 square feet, single tenant 
More than 10,000 square feet, multiple tenants 
(h) Commercial or multiple family use acreage 
which ts nonresidential 
Less than 10 acres 
100 acres or more 
100 acres of more, income approach to value 
(i) All other unusual structures or assignments 
which are much larger or more complex than 
the properties described in (a) to (h) herein. 
(j) Instructing an approved general appraisal 
course of 20 classroom hours or more, not to 
exceed 20 points per year 
(k) Textbook authorship in general appraisal 
topics, not to exceed 20 point* per year 
0) General field journal articles in journals of 
approved national appraisal organizations, 
not to exceed 20 points per year 
(m) Subdivisions or Planned Unit Developments 
1 to 25 units 
Over 25 units 
































1 to 20 
R162-105-1 COMMERCE 468 
maximum 100 points 
Ad Valorem appraisals 
(o) Development and implementation 
of multiple regression model — 





For each additional 5000 parcels, 
add 1 point 
(p) Depreciation study and analysis 
(q) Sales ratio study and implementation 
— physical inspection and review, 
maximum 50 points 
(r) Development of standards 
of practice for 
assessment administration and 
writing of those 
guidelines, maximum 40 points 
(s) State assessed property — 
gravel pits, mines, utilities 
Farm and Ranch appraisals 
(t) Irrigated cropland, pasture 
other than rangeland, 




More than 1000 acres 
(u) Dry farm, 1 to 1000 acres 
More than 1000 acres 
(v) Improvements on properties other than 
a rural residence (maximum 2 points): 
Dwelling 
Sheds 




More than 1000 head 
(x) Sheep ranches 
0-2000 head 
More than 2000 head 
(y) Dairies (includes all improvements 
except a dwelling) 
1-100 head 
101-300 head 
More than 300 head 
(z) Orchards 
5-50 acres 
More than 50 acres 
(aa) Rangeland/timber 
0-640 acres 
More than 640 acres 
(bb) Poultry 
0-100,000 birds 
More than 100,000 birds 
(cc) Mink 
0-5000 cages 
More than 5000 cages 
(dd) Fish farms 
(ee) Hog farms 







































































104.17.2.1. Appraisals on commercial or multifam 
ily form reports shall be worth 75% of the points nor-
mally awarded for the appraisal. 
104.17.2.2. An additional 2.5 points may be added 
for appraisal of any proposed project which is per 
formed from plans and specifications. 
1993 61-2b-l through 61-2b-40 
R162-105-1. Course Credit 
105.1. Education credit will be granted towards 
registration/certification for an appraisal education 
course which meets the following criteria: 
105.1.1. The provider of an approved appraisal edu-
cation course must be one of the following: 
105.1.1.1. An accredited college, university, junior 
college or community college. 
105.1.1.2. A nationally recognized real estate ap-
praisal or real estate related organization, society, 
institute, or association. 
105.1.1.3. A state or federal agency or commission. 
105.1.1.4. Such other school or organization as ap-
proved by the Board. 
105.1.2. The course content shall meet the mini-
mum standards set forth in the State Approved 
Course Outline. 
105.1.2.1. A course must be at least fifteen (15) 
hours in duration (including examination). An hour 
is defined as 50 minutes of supervised contact by a 
certified instructor within a 60 minute time period. 
105.1.2.2. A final examination will be administered 
at the end of each course pertinent to that education 
offering. 
105.1.3. Credit will be granted for a course taken 
prior to July 1, 1990 where the applicant obtained 
credit from the course provider by challenge exami-
nation without attending the course. Provision 
105.1.4 will also apply. 
105.1.3.1. The Board reserves the right to review 
and approve the challenge examination. 
105.1.4. Credit will not be given for duplicate or 
highly comparable classes taken from different 
course providers. 
105.1.5. Credit will be given for appraisal classes 
regardless of when the class was taken until July 1, 
1992, at which time credit will be given for classes 
taken only within ten years immediately preceding 
registration/certification application. 
105.1.5.1. Hourly credit for a course taken from a 
professional appraisal organization will be granted 
based upon the Division approved list which verifies 
hours for such courses. 
105.1.6. Credit will only be granted for a course 
that has been successfully completed. Successful com-
pletion of a course means that the applicant has at-
tended a minimum of 90% of the scheduled class 
hours, has completed all required exercises and as-
signments, and has achieved a passing score on a 
course final examination. 
105.1.7. All education requirements must be met 
prior to applying for the pre-registration/certification 
examination. 
R162-105. Education Requirement 
R162-105-1. Course Credit. 
R162-105-2. Submission for Course Approval. 
R162-105-3. Education Review Committee. 
R162-105-4. Continuing Education. 
R162-105-5. Education Approved by Another State-
R162-105-2. Submission for Course Approval 
105.2. It is the responsibility of the applicant to 
establish that a particular education offering will 
qualify to meet the education requirement for regis-
tration/certification. 
105.2.1. For courses other than those originally cer-
tified by the Division for pre-registration/certification 
purposes, the applicant shall submit on a form pro-
vided by the Division a list of the courses that docu-
ments the name of the course title, the name of the 
sponsoring organization, the number of classroom 
hours, and the date the course was completed. 
105.2.1.1. The applicant will attest on a notarized 
affidavit that the courses have been completed as doc-
umented. 
105.2.1.2. The applicant will support the claim for 
education credit if requested by the Division by pro-
viding proof of completion of the courses in the form 
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A maximum of 300 points will be credited for any one 
twelve month period. 
R162-104-3. Time Allowed for Meeting Experi-
ence Requirement. 
104.3. Time Allowed for Meeting Experience Re-
quirement. Credit will be given for appraisal experi-
ence earned only within five years immediately pre-
ceding the certification application. 
R162-104-4. Proof of Experience. 
104.4. Proof of Experience. The Division shall re-
quire the applicant to furnish the following informa-
tion for each appraisal for which points are claimed: 
Property address or legal description, date of the ap-
praisal, type of property, and any other information 
deemed appropriate by the Division. 
R162-104-5. Compliance with USPAP and Li-
censing Requirements. < 
104.5. No experience credit will be given for ap-
praisals which were performed in violation of Utah 
Law or the law of another jurisdiction. 
104.5.1. No experience credit will be given for ap-
praisals performed after July 1, 1990 by Utah li-
censed appraisers unless the appraisals were done in 
compliance with USPAP. 
104.5.2. No experience credit will be given for ap-
praisals performed after July 1,1990 if the applicant 
was not licensed as an appraiser in Utah, or in an-
other state if licensure was required in that state, at 
the time the appraisal was performed. 
R162-104-6. State-Certified Residential Appli-
cants. 
104.6. State-Certified Residential Applicants. Ap-
plicants applying for certification as State-Certified 
Residential Appraisers must document at least 75% 
of the points submitted from the Residential Experi-
ence Points Schedule. No more than 25% of the total 
points submitted may be from the General Experi-
ence Points Schedule. 
R162-104-7. State-Certified General Applicants. 
104.7. State-Certified General Applicants. Appli-
cants applying for certification as State-Certified 
General Appraisers may claim points for experience 
from either the Residential Experience Points Sched-
ule or the General Experience Points Schedule, so 
long as at least 200 points have been earned from the 
General Experience Points Schedule. 
R162-104-8. Cumulative Points. 
104.8. The cumulative points from instruction of 
appraisal classes and appraisal textbook and article 
authorship shall not exceed 50% of the cumulative 
points submitted. 
Rl62-104-9. Review or Supervision of Ap-
praisals. 
104.9. Review or supervision of appraisals. Review 
appraisals will be awarded experience credit when 
the appraiser has performed technical review(s) of ap-
praisals prepared by either employees, associates or 
others, provided the appraiser complied with Uniform 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice Stan-
dards Rule 3 when the appraiser was required to com-
ply with the rule. The following points shall be 
awarded for review or supervision of appraisals: 
104.9.1. Review of appraisals which does not in-
clude a physical inspection of the property and verifi-
cation of the data, commonly known as a desk review, 
shall be worth 20% of the points awarded to the ap-
praisal if a separate written review appraisal report 
I is prepared. A maximum of 100 points may be earned] 
I by desk review of appraisals. 
I 104.9.2. Review of appraisals which includes a 
I physical inspection of the property and verification of 
the data, commonly known as a field review, shall be 
worth 50% of the points awarded to the appraisal if a 
separate written review appraisal report is prepared 
A maximum of 100 points may be earned by field I 
review of appraisals. 
104.9.3. Supervision of appraisers. Supervision of' 
appraisers shall be worth 20% of the points awarded 
to the appraisal. A maximum of 100 points may be 
earned by supervision of appraisers. 
104.9.4. Not more than 50% of the total experience 
required for certification may be granted under Sub-
sections R162-104-9(l) through R162-104-9(3) and 
Sections R162-104-1K1) and R162-104-1K3) com-
bined. 
R162-104-10. Condemnation Appraisals. 
104.10. Condemnation appraisals shall be worth an 
additional 50% of the points normally awarded for 
the appraisal if the condemnation appraisal included 
a before and after appraisal because of a partial tak-
ing of the property. 
R162-104-11. Preliminary Valuation Estimates, 
Comparative Market Analysis, Real Estate 
Consulting Services, and Other Real Estate 
Experience. 
104.11.1. Preliminary valuation estimates, range of 
value estimates or similar studies, and other real es-
tate related experience gained by bankers, builders, 
city planners and managers, or other individuals may 
be granted credit for up to 50% of the experience re-
quired for certification in accordance with Section 
R162-104-16 of this rule, so long as the experience 
demonstrates to the Board that the applicant has the 
ability to arrive at a fair market value of property 
and to properly document value conclusions. 
104.11.2. Comparative market analysis by real es-
tate licensees may be granted up to 100% experience 
credit toward certification in accordance with Section 
R162-104-16 of this rule, when the analysis is pre-
pared in conformity with USPAP Standards Rules 1 
and 2 and the individual can demonstrate to the 
Board that he is using similar techniques as ap-
praisers to value properties and effectively utilize the 
appraisal process. 
104.11.3. Appraisal analysis, real estate counseling 
or consulting services, and feasibility analysis/study 
will be awarded experience credit in accordance with 
Section R162-104-16 of this rule for up to 50% of the 
experience required toward certification so long as 
the services were performed in accordance with 
USPAP Standards Rules 4 and 5. 
104.11.4. Not more than 50% of the total experi-
ence required for certification may be granted under 
Subsections R162-104-1K1) and R162-104-1K3) and 
Sections R162-104-9U) through R162-104-9C3) com-
bined. 
R162-104-12. Ad Valorem Appraisal and Bench-
mark Appraisal. 
104.12. Ad valorem appraisal and benchmark ap-
praisal by property type will earn the 6ame number of 
points as fee appraisal where the individual can dem-
onstrate that he performed highest and best use anal-
ysis, developed the model in model specification, or 
developed adjustments to the model in model calibra-
tion, and where the individual can demonstrate the 
appraisal was performed in accordance with Stan-
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105.4.4.1. Credit may be granted on a case by case 
basis for teaching, program development, authorship 
of textbooks, or similar activities which are deter-
mined by the Board to be equivalent to obtaining con-
tinuing education. 
105.4.4.2. The Education Review Committee will 
review claims of equivalent education and also alter-
native continuing education proposed to be used for 
continuing education purposes. 
R162-105-5. Education Approved by Another 
State. 
105.5. Credit will be granted toward the education 
requirement for registration/certification or for the 
renewal of certification for any education courses 
which have been taken out of state and have been 
approved by the appraiser licensing agency of an-
other state as meeting the appraiser qualification cri-
teria for registration/certification education or for 
continuing education as defined by the Appraiser 
Qualifications Board of the Appraisal Foundation. 
1993 61-2b-8 through 61-2b-8(3) 
R162-106. Professional Conduct. 
R162-106-1. Uniform Standards. 
R162-106-2. Use of Term "State Certified". 
R162-106-3. Size and Use of Seal. 
R162-106-4. Testimony by an Appraiser. 
R162-106-1. Uniform Standards. 
106.1. Uniform Standards. All appraisers regis-
tered or certified by the division must observe the 
1993 edition of the Uniform Standards of Professional 
Appraisal Practice (USPAP), which is hereby incor-
porated by reference. Copies of the USPAP may be 
obtained from the Appraisal Foundation, 1029 Ver-
mont Avenue N.W., Suite 900, Washington, D C 
20005. Registered or certified appraisers, or candi-
dates for registration or certification, may obtain cop-
ies from the division. 
R162-106-2. Use of Term "State Certified". 
106.2. Use of Term "State Certified". The terms 
"State-Certified Residential Appraiser", "State-Certi-
fied General Appraiser", and "Senior Certified Ap-
praiser" shall not be abbreviated or reduced to a let-
ter or group of letters. If these terms are used on 
letterhead or in advertising, the appraiser's certifi-
cate number must follow his name. 
R162-106-3. Size and Use of Seal. 
106.3. Size and Use of Seal. 
106.3.1. When signing a certified appraisal report, 
a state-certified appraiser shall place on at least the 
certification page of his report, immediately below his 
signature, the seal required by Utah Code Section 
61-2b-17(3)(e). 
106.3.2. The seal to be affixed on reports prepared 
by state-certified appraisers shall contain the words 
"Utah State-Certified Residential Appraiser" or 
"Utah State-Certified General Appraiser" along with 
the appraiser's certificate number and expiration 
date. The zeros preceding the certificate number may 
be deleted. The size of the seal, rectangular in shape, 
shall be no larger than two and seven-eighths inches 
long and five-eighths of an inch high including the 
border. An example of the seal shall be made avail-
able on request at the Division offices. 
106.3.3. The seal may be reproduced as a stamp 
with ink that can be copied, or may be inserted by 
computer in an appraisal report at the appropriate 
place. 
R162-106-4. Testimony by an Appraiser. 
106.4. Testimony. An appraiser who testifies as to 
an appraisal opinion in a deposition or affidavit, or 
before any court, public body, or hearing officer, shall 
prepare a written appraisal report or a file memoran-
dum prior to giving such testimony. 
106.4.1. File memoranda. For the purpose of this 
rule, a file memorandum shall include work sheets, 
data sheets, the reasoning and conclusions upon 
which the testimony is based, and other sufficient 
information to demonstrate substantial compliance 
with USPAP Standards Rule 2-2, or in the case of 




R162-109-1. Formal Adjudicative Proceedings. 
R162-109-2. Informal Adjudicative Proceedings. 
R162-109-3. Hearings Not Required. 
R162-109-4. Hearings Permitted. 
R162-109-5. Procedures for Hearings in Informal Ad-
judicative Proceedings. 
R162-109-1. Formal Adjudicative Proceedings. 
109.1. Any adjudicative proceeding as to the follow-
ing matters shall be conducted on a formal basis: 
109.1.1. the denial of an application for an initial 
appraiser registration or certification for the reasons 
listed in Utah Code Section 61-2b-29; 
109.1.2. the denial of an application for reissuance 
of an appraiser registration or certification for the 
reasons listed in Utah Code Section 61-2b-29; 
109.1.3. the revocation or suspension of an ap-
praiser registration or certification; 
109.1.4. the revocation or suspension of certifica-
tion of appraisal courses, schools, or instructors; 
109.1.5. the imposition of a fine against a regis-
trant or certificate holder; or 
109.1.6. any proceedings conducted subsequent to 
the issuance of a cease and desist order or other emer-
gency order. 
R162-109-2. Informal Adjudicative Proceedings. 
109.2.1. All adjudicative proceedings as to any 
other matters not specifically designated as formal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be conducted as infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings. 
109.2.2. A hearing will be held in an informal adju-
dicative proceeding only if required or permitted by 
the Appraiser Registration and Certification Act or 
these rules. 
109.2.3. A party is not required to file a written 
answer to a notice of agency action from the Division 
in an informal adjudicative proceeding. 
109.2.4. All proceedings on applications for regis-
tration or certification as an appraiser, or for certifi-
cation of appraisal courses, schools, or instructors, 
will be conducted as informal adjudicative proceed-
ings, except as provided in Section 9.1 of this rule. 
109.2.5. All application forms which shall be filled 
out and submitted to the Division for registration or 
certification as an appraiser, or for certification of 
courses, schools, or instructors, shall be deemed a re-
quest for agency action pursuant to the Utah Admin-
